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ARTICLES
PROPERTY IN CRISIS
Nestor M. Davidson*
Rashmi Dyal-Chand**
Property law generally develops gradually, with doctrine slowly
accreting in the interstices of daily conflict and the larger culture of
property likewise emerging at a glacialpace. In times of crisis, however,
fundamental questions about the nature of ownership and the balance
between the individual and the state instantiatedin the structure ofproperty
rise rapidly to the surface. Our current economic crisis-the deepest since
the Great Depression-isno exception.
This economic crisis, more than many in our history, began with
property, sparked in no small measure by structuralflaws in the residential
market and an ownership society that advocated risk taking with
insufficient heed for consequences. Property has likewise played a
palpable role in the still-emerging policy response, with concerns about
creepingsocialism andfears of nationalizationshaping regulatory design.
As a result, this crisis has unsettled long-stagnant tensions in property
theory. It is providing a vivid reminder of the interconnected nature of
property while recalibratingthe role of property as a repositoryfor risk
and reward. These conceptual shifts have brought the state's role in
shapingproperty to the fore, starkly-albeitperhaps temporarily-placing
great weight on the public, communitarian,and even punitive aspects of the
nature of property. This crisis thus provides a powerful window to assess
the currentstate of our property discourse and begin to glean lessons about
the directionsin which property may evolve in the aftermath.
Although scholars have begun to grapple with the causes and some of the
particularconsequences of the current crisis, there has been relatively little
theoretical engagement with the role of property norms in the origins of,
Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School.
** Professor, Northeastern University School of Law.
The authors wish to thank Libby Adler, Greg Alexander, Peter Byrne, Kristen Carpenter,
Michael Diamond, Benjamin Ericson, Joshua Grinspoon, Janet Halley, Clare Huntington,
Sonia Katyal, Adam Levitin, Joseph William Singer, Phil Weiser, and participants in the
Georgetown Law School/PSCE Workshop on the Public Nature of Private Property and the
Northeastern University School of Law faculty colloquium. Annmarie Cording, Kendall
Burgemeister, Pamela Ruth Emery, and Kristen Van Slyke provided valuable research
assistance. Thanks also to Alfreda Russell of the Northeastern University Law Library for
her research support.
*
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and in the regulatory response to, the crisis. By identifying the intersection
of crisis and property theory with greater clarity, this Article lays the
groundworkfor normative efforts movingforward. It holds broaderlessons
as well for understanding the contingent nature of legal change and the
structure of one of our most foundationalsocial institutions.
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INTRODUCTION

Property law and the larger discourse of property are forged not only in
the steady accretion of economic and social development, but also in
moments of dramatic change. Repeatedly throughout American history,
times of crisis have brought to the fore fundamental questions about the
nature of property, the state's role in this aspect of private ordering, and the
balance between the individual and the community. We are now
experiencing the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression and,
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not surprisingly, we are witnessing a similar reassessment of deep-seated
property norms.
As individual failures of homeownership have cascaded into spirals of
distress in communities across the country, "toxic" debt has been injected
into some of the nation's largest financial institutions, freezing credit
markets globally. The federal government has responded on a scale rarely
seen in American history. In short order, we have witnessed trillions of
dollars pumped into financial markets, the nationalization of major
enterprises, and the unleashing of a stimulus program touching almost every
sector of the economy.
The current economic crisis has already made basic questions about the
nature of property a daily aspect of our cultural and political dialogue. As
the crisis deepened and the government's response grew accordingly, there
was an increasingly loud chorus of popular outcry asserting that the
meaning of property has somehow been cast into flux.' Versions of the
sentiment that a fundamental shift is afoot can be found throughout the
press and blogosphere. 2 For some, this shift is cause for celebration, but
3
more often it is a source of anxiety.
This kind of tumult in a time of change is nothing new in the history of
American property law. The deepest social and cultural fault lines around
property inexorably rise to the surface in moments of crisis and leave their
mark on the texture of property law. Just as the development of property
law evinces an ebb and flow between crystalline rules and equitable
muddying, 4 in a larger sense the history of American property law
represents a long-running battle for primacy between theoretical end points.
These competing poles have variably been embodied in dichotomous
conceptions of private versus public, the individual versus the state, classic
liberalism versus civic republicanism, and similar invocations of a stillenduring primal divide. 5 Struggles over oppositional visions of propertyand, however phrased, these theoretical constructs are as much ideal types
as actual underlying norms-tend to reach critical turning points in
moments of political and economic crisis. No crisis ever really generates a
final synthesis that resolves underlying tensions, and the cycle continues.

1. Newsweek captured this moment tellingly with a cover declaring, "We Are All
Socialists Now." Jon Meacham & Evan Thomas, We Are All Socialists Now, NEWSWEEK,

Feb. 16, 2009, at 23.
2. Sources on this cascade daily, and it takes only a few select headlines to get a sense
of the tenor of much of the popular commentary on what the crisis and response might mean.
See, e.g., Posting of Reenita Malhotra to The Inspired Economist Blog, Does the Bank
Bailout Spell Socialism?
Why Won't Geithner Let "Zombie Banks" Fail?,
http://inspiredeconomist.com/2009/02/13/does-the-bank-bailout-spell-socialism-why-wontgeithner-let-zombie-banks-fail/ (Feb. 13, 2009); O'Reilly Factor: Is America Sliding
Towards Socialism? (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 20, 2009).
3. See supra note 2.
4. See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv.
577 (1988).
5. See infra Part I.A.

1610

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

Because the current economic crisis started in the housing market and
because the response has sparked primal concerns about how the
government is reshaping the nature of ownership, it is a crisis even more
deeply grounded in and evocative of property. Indeed, the veneration of
homeownership opportunities and particular visions of risk and reward
contributed materially to the conditions that led to global economic
meltdown. 6 This has underscored the fact that property is an interconnected
institution, providing a vivid reminder of the power of ecological and
social-relations conceptions of property and an equally stark reminder that
unfettered risk carries the potential for contagion that our system of
property cannot long tolerate.
Regulatory responses to the crisis have likewise demonstrated that
contested norms of ownership have served as a palpable constraint on
regulatory design. 7 As various bailouts, stimulus plans, housing-market
rescue efforts, and other interventions have emerged, questions such as
whether it is appropriate to take equity stakes in financial firms in return for
assistance have become significant flashpoints. 8 The federal government
has at times been reluctant to move too quickly in this direction, while at
times appearing coercive and even retributive in its stance toward
ownership. 9 This is not to argue that any particular mix of regulations,
loans, investments, equity stakes, or broader stimulus plans would
necessarily be normatively preferable or practically more effective than
what we have witnessed to date. Instead, these observations serve primarily
to underscore the discernable power that property norms have had in
guiding regulatory design, for better or worse, towards some approaches
and away from others.
Examining property in times of crisis thus provides a powerful way to
unearth both the current landscape of tensions underlying property theory
and the pragmatics of property in operation. It is too early to draw
definitive conclusions about the residue that this crisis will leave on
property doctrine. As with many previous crises, there are already
important legal changes emerging in the regulatory response that may prove
lasting in areas such as mortgage law, bankruptcy, access to credit, and
others. 10 On the deeper structure of property law and the culture of
property that this structure embodies, however, the crisis has already left its
mark.
We leave to others the task of debating the precise predicates of the
current crisis and the details of the still-emerging response, as scholars have
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part III.B.

8. See, e.g., RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC
DOWNTURN AND PROTECTIONISM 9 (2009); JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE U.S. MORTGAGE AND CREDIT MARKETS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET
MELTDOWN 269-74 (2009); BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ONGOING GOVERNMENT
ASSISTANCE FOR AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP (AIG) 1-2 (2009).

9. See infra Parts II.A, III.A.
10. See infra Part III.C.
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already begun to do." 1 But that discourse would benefit from a clearer
conceptual understanding that situates property norms in this crisis and this
crisis in the evolution of property norms. This Article, accordingly, seeks
to isolate central theoretical lessons-arguably the central lessons-that this
crisis holds for legal scholars, and to provide a framework through which
emerging scholarship on the crisis can proceed. By identifying patterns of
change in property theory with greater clarity and elucidating the
consequences of the cyclical nature of moments of dislocation, this Article
lays a foundation for normative efforts moving forward.
In the end, our current moment of economic dislocation may pass with
relatively minor long-term disruption, and the Herculean efforts underway
to respond may take hold. But we have not seen the end of the meltdown.
A sentiment that has become a recurring trope of late is that a "crisis is a
terrible thing to waste." 1 2 The current crisis provides an important
opportunity to interrogate basic questions about the nature of property,
ownership, and community-an opportunity not to be wasted.

The Article is organized as follows. Part I lays the groundwork for
understanding property in crisis by outlining theories of change in the
development of property law. The part illustrates the ways in which steadystate change has alternated in American history with moments of dramatic
contestation. Throughout, the discourse of property has balanced norms of
individualism and community, localism and uniformity, as well as
piecemeal, retrospective development and forward-looking, systemic
approaches to change.
Part II then turns to the current economic crisis. The part discusses what
is known about the roots of the crisis and how the landscape of policy
responses is emerging. It then isolates and explains the role of property law
and norms in both the genesis of the crisis and in the government's reaction.
Finally, Part III shifts from the descriptive to the theoretical, arguing that
this particular moment deeply illuminates current conceptions of property
and the evolving nature of the institution of property itself. The crisis, Part
III contends, reveals a vision of property as interconnected, sensitive to
distributional consequences, and as much about collective security and an
active state as it is about individual risk and reward. Conversely,
11. Legal scholarship to date on the crisis has focused largely on predicates to the crisis,
see, e.g., Symposium, Subprime Meltdown: The Law and Finance of the American Home
Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1107; Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D.
Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2009), or
has focused on specific aspects of the response, see, e.g., Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy
Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV.
727 (2009); Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages
in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 565; David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess:
The New RegulatoryLandscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709 (2009).

12. See Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Kicking Over the Chessboard,N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 2004, § 4, at 13 (quoting Stanford economist Paul Romer).
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conceptions of property as variably inviolate and flexible have guided the
regulatory response to the crisis, with the state reactively seeking to
preserve property as a locus of opportunity at all levels of market
participation while at the same time prospectively valorizing a less
comfortable vision of appropriation on behalf of the public. Part III
concludes with broader reflections of where the crisis may leave the
discourse of property. In sum, the current crisis provides an unparalleled
window through which to observe what the fire this time means for this
foundational social institution.
I. MODES OF CHANGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY LAW

Like many traditional areas of common law, property law generally
develops in the interstices of individual conflict resolution and legislative
change, gradually transforming over long periods. 13 Property has an
inherently conservative tendency in this respect, perhaps unsurprising given
the deep investment in existing institutional arrangements that property
represents at any given time. However, in the American experience,
property law-and the larger culture of property-have witnessed moments
of deep contestation, times of crisis that call foundational concepts into
question. Understanding this dual evolutionary dynamic is critical to any
exploration of the current economic crisis, particularly as this crisis informs
our normative impulses moving forward.
In this part, we approach this pattern on three levels. First, as a predicate
to understanding how crisis unsettles property, we outline some perennial
and long-standing tensions in property theory that undergird fault lines in
property law. We next turn to a discursive methodology for examining
property in crisis, drawing on theoretical frames that contrast steady-state
change with punctuated equilibrium and exploring the structural forces that
promote relative stasis in property law. Finally, we give historical
examples of what we call, borrowing from Bruce Ackerman's exploration
14
of transformational constitutional realignments, "property moments."
A. PrimaryAxes of Contestationin the Dialectic of Property
In the American tradition, debates about property have often fallen along
two central axes. On the one hand, the association of property with
possessive individualism and unfettered alienability have been deep and
intertwined property norms since the Founding. Competing with this
conception, however, have always been communitarian or civic republican
ideals that emphasize the social construction of property and property's role

13. See Quintin Johnstone, Major Issues in Real PropertyLaw, 55 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1990).
14. Cf 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
(1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (together theorizing and illuminating
significant historical moments of constitutional change).

2010]

PROPERTY IN CRISIS

1613

in social ordering. 15 Neither ideal type has ever existed in pure form in
American law, but the larger discourse of property tends to gravitate
between them. And these ever-competing norms have been placed in
starkest light in times of upheaval, where the necessity, or perhaps bare
reality, of the state's role in what is otherwise considered private ordering
through property becomes most visible. 16
In the literature on the development of property law, a closely related
tension has long persisted between bottom-up versus top-down conceptions
of the individual-state relationship vis-A-vis property that essentially
recapitulates the debate about the relative merits of pre- versus postpolitical
visions of property. 17 One foundational organic vision is the Lockean ideal
of property as a bulwark against the state, 18 while civic republican
perspectives have generally been more comfortable with the reality of an
active state role. 1 9 In a modem version of this tension, Saul Levmore has
framed the development of property law as a conflict between selforganizing norms of efficiency versus rent seeking through the organs of
the state. 20 In some ways, structuralist explanations that emerge from
critical perspectives parallel Levmore's rent-seeking story, 2 1 although the
power dynamics that dominate this narrative are 22decidedly different from
the assumptions reflected in efficiency paradigms.
Another reflection of this perennial dichotomy manifests itself in the
divide between the relative significance of various forms of property,
whether real versus personal or, increasingly, "old" property versus so15. See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING
VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (1997).
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, What Government Can Do for Property (and Vice Versa),
in 4 THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 209, 210-11 (Nicholas Mercuro & Warren J.
Samuels eds., 1999); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the
Evolution of PrivateProperty, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005).
18. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the influence of Lockean
conceptions of property as a "bulwark of freedom from arbitrary government").
19. See ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 2 (describing a competing vision of property
grounded in "a commitment to the basic idea that the core purpose of property is not to
satisfy individual preferences or to increase wealth but to fulfill some prior normative vision
of how society and the polity that governs it should be structured"); see also Stanley N. Katz,
Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467,
470 (1976).
20. See Saul Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 181, 184-86 (2003).
21. Although the reductionist Marxist narrative of an inexorable historical progression
from feudalism to capitalism to socialism no longer finds many adherents, deterministic
materialist arguments about structural forces that perhaps conspiratorially drive legal change
are not hard to find.
22. There is a normative dimension to this developmental debate. For materialists like
Saul Levmore, idealizing efficiency maximizing norms-a defensible if reductionist
position-tends to relegate all other interactions to the illegitimacy of rent seeking.
Conversely, communitarian and civic republican visions of property begin with less
normative suspicion of state ordering.
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called "new" property. 23 In property theory, traditional forms of property
often stand for bottom-up, individualistic paradigms, while complex
intangibles and intellectual property tend to reflect more explicit
recognition of the top-down, regulatory nature of property.
Conceptually, then, debates about the development and nature of
property law can be seen as a dialectic between two competing visions of
property. On a basic level, theorists track ownership along a spectrum that
starts with "public" or common holding of a given resource, moves towards
greater exclusivity and individual control, and arrives at the other end with
something like Blackstone's sole and absolute dominion. 24 That these
archetypes rarely exist in pure form has not stopped theorists from
ceaselessly debating the normative and practical interplay between them
and the forces that tend to push entitlements toward one end of the spectrum
or the other.
In all, these disparate vocabularies reflect overarching tensions that
strongly inform not only disputes over land and property rights but also, at a
deeper level, popular reaction to the role of the regulatory state. These
tensions have played out primarily in the structure of constitutional
property, although that structure in turn enables much underlying doctrine.
Thus, in the pre-New Deal Lochner v. New York 25 era, the Court actively
policed a balance between state power and the claimed sanctity of property,
giving foundational weight at times to a common-law driven vision of the
latter. 26 More recently, the same tension has played out in jurisprudential
conflicts over regulatory takings. 2 7 Similar balancing certainly informs the
many daily disputes that the law of property resolves, if more as a set of
background norms. 28
23. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
24. See generally David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10

103 (2009).
25. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
26. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.

THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.

REV. 421, 437-38 (1987).

27. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited:
Phantom
Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings "Muddle," 90 MINN. L. REV. 826 (2006). See
generally DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS (2002) (reviewing

contemporary takings jurisprudence).
28. In the American context, this tension plays out as well along lines of localism versus
nationalism. Traditionally, property has been seen as a quintessentially localist institution,
emanating from state law and grounded in particularized, small-scale norms. See, e.g.,
Stewart E. Sterk, The FederalistDimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,114 YALE

L.J. 203, 205 (2004) ("The 'property' protected by the Takings Clause is defined not by a
single sovereign, but by the legislative enactments and judicial pronouncements of fifty
separate states."). This reflects property's common-law origins and a deep intuition that the
content of property law arises from localized patterns of use and conflict. Indeed, there are
many doctrinal echoes of this localized vision of property. Customary rights, for example,
give legal effect to local patterns of use that paradigmatically (if fictitiously) have existed
since "the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
PROPERTY 700 (6th ed. 2006).

On the other side has always been pressure for national supremacy, whether
embodied in federal constitutional protection for property, see Thomas W. Merrill, The
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The tension between public and private in property reflects larger, and
perhaps intractable, ambiguities over the relationship between the state and
the individual in private ordering. 29 In this sense, the question is not formal
ownership-public, private, or any number of hybrid approaches 3 0 -but
rather the nature of legal property itself. Does property primarily constitute
state recognition of a priori private relations, as in certain simplistic
versions of the Lockean narrative? Or is the state the essential force that
defines the nature of property rights, mediating individual relationships
through conscious or default choices to privilege one set of entitlements
over another?
The relative valence of these ideological poles remains contested in the
historiography, 3 1 but the deep resonance of these competing conceptions is
clear. As discussed below, these debates manifest in particularized form in
disputes about conceiving property as insular and isolated versus property
as an interconnected whole, property as a platform for individual
opportunity versus property as a locus for egalitarian distribution, and
property as reward for individual risk or property as an institutional form of
security. 32 All of these underlying tensions exist in times of stasis, slowly
influencing the development of property law. In times of crisis, however,
the fault lines that such tensions expose are revealed much more explicitly.
It is to that dynamic that we now turn.
B. Steady States and PunctuatedEquilibriain the Development of Property
In political science, institutional history, and related fields, scholars have
developed a useful vocabulary for understanding the dynamics of
institutional evolution, contrasting relatively steady-state, gradual

Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 886-90 (2000), or in the

pragmatic reality that national (and now increasingly global) markets have demanded a
measure of uniformity. See Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market-A
Catalystfor Change in Real Estate Transactions,39 Sw. L.J. 991, 991 (1986); Michael H.
Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: ResidentialReal Estate FinanceLaw in the 1990s and the
Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1261-63 (1991).

These two foci of legal ordering have always coexisted in uneasy tension in property, with a
rhetoric that tends to extol local diversity and a reality that increasingly (and especially, as
we shall see, in moments of crisis) reflects conformity to national exigencies.
29. Cf Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: The Birth of Natural Order, The

Illusion of Free Markets 3 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ. Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 433, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1278067 (challenging
comparative conceptions of paradigmatically "free" and "regulated" markets).
30. See, e.g., A FOURTH WAY? PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW
MARKET ECONOMIES (Gregory S. Alexander & Graznya Skapska eds., 1994).
31. See William W. Fisher III, Stories About Property,94 MICH. L. REV. 1776, 1786-87
(1996) (reviewing CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY,
THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994)) (discussing historiographic developments in
visions of the ideology of property); id. at 1788 (noting the increasing scholarly critique of a
simple bipolar perspective).
32. See infra Part III.A.
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development with moments of significant disjuncture. 33 In its application
to each new field, the vocabulary adjusts and matures, while still
elucidating common themes of the forces that can preserve stasis and then
give way to significant change.
This conceptual framework builds on work that originated with the
theory of punctuated equilibrium in evolution. 34
In brief, classic
evolutionary theory posited that changes at the species level occur through a
steady accumulation of incremental differentiation. As natural selection
reinforces these changes, species gradually evolve. Niles Eldredge and
Stephen Jay Gould, however, argued that the fossil record contains too
much evidence that contradicts this model of uniform change, with frequent
examples of long-term and relatively undisturbed stasis punctuated by
massive change in relatively short order. 35 Thus, they hypothesized that a
relatively steady equilibrium is disrupted, generally by some significant
exogenous force, which leads to rapid adaptation and a new equilibrium. 36
Scholars have borrowed these two contrasting frames to argue that
political ordering, policy choices, law, and even the structure of scientific
thought, 37 often develop gradually, constrained institutionally and socially,
and then-like speciation-morph rapidly. In a variety of areas, steady
hydraulic change is occasionally punctuated by some confluence of factors
(economic crisis, technological revolution, war) causing social or legal
change that parallels Eldredge and Gould's phyletic paradigm shifts.
Paleontology provides apt metaphors, then, for understanding how complex
systems adapt to rapidly changing conditions and external shocks.
33. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY
IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); Connie J. G. Gersick, Revolutionary Change Theories: A
Multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 10
(1991). A closely parallel intellectual development can be found in institutional historical
theories of "critical junctures." See Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Study of
CriticalJunctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in HistoricalInstitutionalism,
59 WORLD POL. 341 (2007); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The
Course and Patternof Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 64142 (2001) (discussing this linkage).
Critical junctures constrain future institutional
arrangements in particularly significant ways and, like punctuated equilibria, are often found
during times of significant change. See Capoccia & Kelemen, supra, at 341 (describing a
"dual model of institutional development characterized by relatively long periods of pathdependent institutional stability and reproduction that are punctuated occasionally by brief
phases of institutional flux.., during which more dramatic change is possible").
34. The modem paleontological literature on punctuated equilibria traces to Niles
Eldredge & Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic
Gradualism, in MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY 82 (Thomas J. M. Schopf ed., 1972). Phyletic

gradualism, to which punctuated equilibrium was proposed as an alternative, is predicated on
steady accumulated species changes. Id. at 83-84. See generally MICHAEL SHERMER, THE
BORDERLANDS OF SCIENCE: WHERE SENSE MEETS NONSENSE (2001). It is customary in
citations to Eldredge and Gould's theory to note that punctuated equilibrium has been
challenged in evolutionary studies. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER:
WHY THE EVIDENCE OF EVOLUTION REVEALS A UNIVERSE WITHOUT DESIGN (1996).

35. Eldredge & Gould, supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. Cf THOMAS

S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE

OF SCIENTIFIC

REVOLUTIONS

(discussing patterns of paradigm shifts in the history of scientific thought).

(1962)
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The legal literature has proven congenial to invocations of theories of
steady-state change versus punctuated equilibrium. 3 8 Perhaps the best
known example is Bruce Ackerman's work on moments of constitutional
crisis and realignment. 39 Ackerman argues that U.S. history has seen
several distinctive periods of popular constitutionalism, during which "We
the People" have acted in a kind of higher lawmaking capacity to amend the
existing constitutional order.40 Ackerman focuses on the Revolutionary era,
the Civil War realignment, and the New Deal to argue that at each of these
upheaval literally changed the meaning of
junctures, a process of popular
41
the Federal Constitution.
42
Ackerman's thesis has been as controversial as it has been influential,
but it does highlight the role of crisis in opening up a legal discourse
beyond the frames that institutional stasis generally imposes. It may be that
in an area such as property, differences between steady-state and punctuated
change in law are more questions of degree than kind, as any series of legal
changes in long-enough retrospect can seem transformative. But it is
possible to see a recurring pattern in U.S. history of repeated disjunctions,
43
what might be described, Ala Ackerman, as "property moments."
To be clear, to invoke Ackerman's paradigm here is not to argue for a
strict dualist vision of lawmaking in the arena of property in which popular
political forces upend existing institutional arrangements. 44 Rather, it is
38. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 33, at 613-17 (discussing evolutionary path
dependence and punctuated equilibrium as paradigms for evaluating legal change); cf
Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence,64 TEX. L. REv. 645 (1985)
(tracing the influence of Darwinian evolutionary theories on the history of jurisprudence).
For a discussion of tensions within historiographical traditions in legal scholarship, see
Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 273, 274-75 & n.2 (1991) (contrasting "'evolutionary' and
'transformational' frameworks" and offering a dialectic alternative to "embrace both
continuity and discontinuity as historiographical themes").
39. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 14; ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS,
supra note 14; see also Walter Dean Burnham, Constitutional Moments and Punctuated
Equilibria: A Political Scientist Confronts Bruce Ackerman's We The People, 108 YALE
L.J. 2237 (1999) (discussing the parallels between Ackerman's theory and the politicalscience literature on critical realignments).
supra note 14, at 6-7; ACKERMAN,
40. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 20 (arguing for a model of popular constitutional
change that begins with constitutional impasse, moves to an electoral mandate, followed by a
challenge to dissenting institutions, a judicial validation of the new order (a "switch in
time"), and, finally, a consolidating election).
41. See generally ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14 (charting fundamental
constitutional realignments at each of these transformative "constitutional moments").
42. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, What's a Constitutionfor Anyway? Of History and Theory,
Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 885 (1996); Colin Gordon,
Rethinking the New Deal, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 2029 (1998) (reviewing ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14).
43. Cf Capoccia & Kelemen, supra note 33, at 350 & n.36 (discussing the terminology
of "moments" to describe "critical junctures" of significant institutional change).
44. Nor do we mean to suggest that Ackerman's is the only, or even the most apposite
vocabulary for applying evolutionary theory to property law. Cf James E. Krier,
Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 139 (2009).
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more prosaically to recognize that moments of economic and social
upheaval provide opportunities to loosen the normally fairly tight bounds of
debate about the nature of property, both in its constitutional and its more
common-law-oriented aspects. The point, then, is to focus less on some
form of higher politics and more on a discursive practice that has
particularly important consequences in times of crisis.
Applying this vocabulary of institutional evolution to the arena of
property, then, it is appropriate first to outline in general terms forces that
shape a dynamic of general stasis in legal change. It is, after all, against
these forces that crisis operates. In times of steady-state change, underlying
structural shifts in society and the economy gradually bring new challenges
to the legal system. Long-term structural changes, such as the settling of
the American continent, the Industrial Revolution, or the rise of urbanism in
the nineteenth century, create new conflicts to which the law must
respond. 45 The legal system, in the context of individual conflict
resolution-one neighbor against another, one property holder defending
her entitlements-then reacts and tends in the ordinary course to adapt
incrementally out of such small-scale concerns.
Cultural influences have been equally important, particularly as a
distinctive American legal identity emerged from its British roots. Changed
conceptions of gender and racial equality, for example, exerted powerful
influence on the development of property law and the rhetoric of property.
The nineteenth-century Married Women's Property Acts 4 6 and the
twentieth-century civil rights movement 47-both of which left fundamental
changes in the fabric of property law-are two of the most prominent
examples, but by no means the only ones. We will leave it to historians to
argue about the relative weight that materialist and idealist influences
played at any given moment in the development of American property law,
but it is clear that the dialectic of property involves both influences.
Running counter to influences that generate change over time are
constraints that exert strong pressure to limit significant developments in
the law. The resources available to the state, for example, to influence
private ordering can be an independent variable that can slow incremental
changes in property law. 48 Likewise, the institutional and individual
capacity of actors in the legal system to instantiate change, whether in terms
of limitations of the judicial enterprise or the scope of the regulatory state,

45. These changes seem dramatic in retrospect, but presented the legal system with
relatively long periods during which to adapt.
46. See generally MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY
AMERICA (1986).
47. See generally Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities and the Political Function of
Property,49 UCLA L. REv. 1553 (2002).
48. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 77 (2d ed. 1985).

Friedman argues that during the colonial era, "the desire to rule, and rule broadly, was
tempered by the modest means, in taxes and staff, that rulers had at their command.
Regulation tended to be local, and as cheap in money and men as possible." Id.
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limits creativity and reifies a certain degree of conservatism in existing
49
norms.
Finally, built above the interface between these economic and social
forces and the hydraulic pressures they exert on law are a variety of other
mediating institutions, including lawyers, judges, legislators, and,
increasingly, the apparatus of the modem regulatory state. 50 These
institutions tend to be invested in the existing legal order and act as
stabilizing forces in the face of pressures for adaptation.
In short, competing dynamic and mediating forces generate relative stasis
in ordinary times, with property more than many areas of law reflecting the
significant path dependency that derives from the deep investment that
property represents at any given moment. 51 In times of crisis, however, this
balance can be upended, and ordinary path-dependent incremental change
can give way to much more fundamental contestation. This dynamic
manifests itself as a divide between piecemeal, reactive approaches to
conflicts about property on the one hand, and more proactive and systemic
approaches on the other. 52 Whether at the local level, with the slow
accretion of common-law change, or at the national level in response to
disjunction, property is often explicitly retrospective, validating the existing
order and lending stability in the face of accumulated expectations. 53
Indeed, regulatory change that unsettles those expectations raises the most
contentious questions in property law, and courts still struggle with how
much latitude legislatures and other regulatory bodies should receive to
force change outside of traditional property norms. 54 At times, however,
49. This individual and institutional path dependence makes moments of crisis all the
more significant.
50. Cf William Weston Fisher III, The Law of the Land: An Intellectual History of
American Property Doctrine, 1776-1880, at 1-4 (Sept. 1991) (unpublished Ph.D.

dissertation, Harvard University) (describing the interaction between legal discourse and
related discourses in social theory, economics, popular discourse, and others).
51. Cf Hathaway, supra note 33, at 613-17. The path dependency that derives from the
long-term nature of much property of any value represents a constraint on the various
institutions that shape property law.
52. Cf Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193,210-34 (2008) (contrasting

regulatory approaches to system risk).
53. Cf JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-12 (C. K. Ogden ed.,

Richard Hildreth trans., Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1931) (1802) ("Property is nothing but a
basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we
are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in which we stand towards it."). See
generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.

REV. 531 (2005). For an insightful discussion of the tension between norms of stability and
the reality of disjunction in property, see John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed
Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REV. 463, 466 (2007) (noting that property "is typically

understood as an institution whose very identity and purpose is intimately associated with
the task of promoting stability-not with responding to... radical change" and exploring
how property actually does respond to such change).
54. This plays out, for example, in the prominence that "background principles" of state
property law have taken on in the wake of the Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). Lucas attempted to cabin legal change that
could be accomplished without compensation to "traditional" property norms largely
instantiated in the common law of nuisance, but courts have continued to validate modem
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the regulatory system takes a more forward-looking approach to the
structure of private ordering through property 55and grapples with what
expectations should be appropriate prospectively.
C. "PropertyMoments" in RecurringPatterns
As a result of crisis, property law and property norms have undergone
moments of significant contestation throughout American history. In
briefly cataloging these moments using the vocabulary of institutional
evolution, our goal is to illustrate the oft-understated role of crisis in
shaping the discourse of property. Each of the "property moments"
discussed here could merit-indeed, most have merited-an entire literature
of their own. 56 Moreover, we do not propose any rigid typology of the ages
of American property law, 57 or delve in depth into the contested causes and
consequences of each of these critical turning points. Rather, in this
discussion we simply note the surprising regularity with which our political
and legal culture is confronted with moments of punctuated equilibrium that
raise fundamental questions about the nature of property. Repeatedly, crisis
resurrects the same long-standing tensions in property theory, often
deepening the corresponding fault lines in property law.
To begin, one need not delve far into debates about Charles Beard's
argument that the Federal Constitution, particularly its protections for
contract and property, enshrined the economic power of the Founding
Fathers 58 to recognize that fundamental questions about the nature of
property were actively contested in the Revolutionary and early Federal

conceptions of the harms that can flow from the use of property. See, e.g., Christie Olsson,
Takings Law in the Aftermath of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Does The
Background Principles Exception Clarify or Complicate Regulatory Takings Law?, 45
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 707, 721-24 (2005).

55. Zoning law, for example, seeks to set forward-looking parameters for the resolution
of conflicts over land use, in contrast to the generally backward-looking, reactive nature of
nuisance.
56. For helpful general empirical and theoretical discussions of cycles of economic crisis
in the United States, see, for example, GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES:
CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY (2008); CHARLES
P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005). Perhaps the best-known scholar of economic crisis is the
late Hyman Minsky. Minsky, an economist, argued that the credit cycle is inherently
unstable, with a model that typically begins with some opportunity that raises investment
expectations, leading to an increasingly euphoric boom. The market then tops out and some
investors begin to exit, which eventually leads to a panic. See, e.g., HYMAN P. MINSKY, JOHN

MAYNARD KEYNES (1975); Hyman P. Minsky, The FinancialInstability Hypothesis (Jerome
Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 74, 1992), available at
http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp74.pdf.
57. Cf GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). Gilmore's periodization
of American law, which he drew from Karl Llewellyn's The Common Law Tradition, id. at

11, is relevant here, but in the development of conceptions of property, we are focusing on
the disjunctions between eras.
58. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
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periods. 59 Early American history saw conflicts over the confiscation of
Loyalist property, skirmishes over slavery, rebellions and populist
arguments about redistribution, and debt crises, among other crucibles at
60
the formation of our property law.
Indeed, the Yazoo Land Scandal in the 1780s and 1790s was perhaps the
first crisis that approximates our current meltdown, and it had a notable
effect on early American property law. 61 The scandal involved the bribing
of the legislature of Georgia to sell tens of millions of acres of contested
public land, roughly what would become modem Alabama and
Mississippi. 62 This early crisis led, among other things, to the first
invalidation of a state law as unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Fletcher v. Peck63-upholding the land transfers, 64 even though secured
through bribery-and had important implications for the eventual
settlement of the West.
Within a generation after the Founding, an uneasy stasis was to be found
that largely lasted until the Civil War. That crisis and its legal aftermath,
most notably in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments,
represented a moment of significant disjunction and unstable resolution in
the structure of property. 65 The Civil War Amendments not only barred
slavery, but also ironically laid the foundation for the eventual
constitutionalization of broad protection for property in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Again, after crisis, the pendulum swung. Late nineteenthcentury formalism can hardly be said to have grown directly in response to
state intervention in property rights. 66 However, the ideological and
59. See, e.g., Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concernfor the Security of Property Rights
on the Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1135.
60. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992)

(discussing doctrinal developments in property law arising out of the Revolution); see also
Fisher, supra note 50, at 4 (describing "watershed[]" moments in the development of
American property law, bookended by the Revolution and Reconstruction).
61. See ROBERT V. HINE & JOHN MACK FARAGHER, THE AMERICAN WEST:
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 112-13 (2000).

A NEW

62. Id.
63. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
64. Id. at 142-43.
65. See ELY, supra note 18, at 83-84 (discussing ways in which the exigencies of the
Civil War led to significant reordering of existing property rights, including the abolition of
slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment and the Confiscation Acts during the war).
66. Developments in conceptions of property rights in the nineteenth century raise very
interesting questions about the public/private divide, and the role of the state in fostering a
uniquely American property law. For example, Willard Hurst has argued that a prevailing
vision in the early nineteenth century was of property as a dynamic source of productive
potential, rather than a static barrier against the state. See generally Willard Hurst, The
Release of Energy, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES 109 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988). And Harry
Scheiber has ably chronicled the many ways in which an array of sectors were increasingly
granted sweeping powers, notably the power of eminent domain, to alter property

arrangements as a means of fostering infrastructure and industrial development. See
generally Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by
Government, 1789-1910, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, supra, at
132.
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rhetorical foundations of pre-New Deal substantive due process protections
for property rights were in some sense forged in the crisis of the midnineteenth century.
Tensions between classical liberal and civic republican visions of
property again came to dominate the discourse during the Great Depression,
an economic and social crisis not entirely unlike the one we are now
experiencing, although (so far) of much greater magnitude. The New Deal
and the revolution it spawned in constitutional jurisprudence-rejecting
Lochnerian oversight of basic economic regulation-was perhaps
67
predictably attacked as the dawning of collectivization and communism.
And it is no coincidence that the work of the Legal Realists in attacking
formalist conceptions of property, although generally predating the New
68
Deal, took hold largely against this backdrop.
This crisis and response revealed deep anxieties about what the Supreme
Court was doing to property rights, but nonetheless confirmed the
constitutional validity of the modem regulatory state. At the same time that
a constitutional revolution was underway, the ground level law of property
was changing in response to crisis as well. Exercising power the Court
affirmed after initial doubts, the New Deal transformed the housing market
69
through standardizing and insuring thirty-year fixed mortgages.
Regulatory intervention also sowed the first seeds of modem consumer
70
rights law.
American history has witnessed any number of other, perhaps less
momentous, crises and financial panics up to (and now beyond) the Savings
and Loan Crisis of the 1980s. 71 Similar stories can be told about public
outrage, institutional reordering, and reflexive response that raise questions
about the nature of property as an institution and legal force. 72 What this
brief overview highlights is that a series of critical junctures throughout our
history provoked fundamental questions about the nature of property and
intensified preexisting tensions in property law. It is possible to trace

67. See generally ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN
AMERICA (1998).
68. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, PropertyandSovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1928).
69. See Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical

and InternationalContext, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 94-96 (2005) (discussing New Deal era
structural interventions in the mortgage market).

70. For an illuminating history of these developments, see LIZABETH COHEN, A
CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 18-61
(2003) (discussing the Depression and the rise of the "citizen consumer").
71. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 56, at 2-3.

72. Lawrence Friedman outlines, for example, a perennial cycle of debtor-creditor
struggles in the terms of mortgage law that has flared repeatedly in times of crisis. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 48, at 245-48. As early as the Panic of 1819, which led the state of
New York to legislate a one-year grace period for "hard-pressed land debtors," doctrinal
shifts have followed economic upheaval. Id. at 247.
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doctrinal changes to some of these crises, 73 but we are less interested in
probing any specific innovation than in illustrating a common pattern.
This discussion does raise a question about what makes a crisis a "crisis,"
a question that is difficult to answer definitively. Intuitively, it is possible
to point to a historically felt sense at any given moment. Accounts of the
Revolution, the Civil War, the Great Depression, and other less significant
moments are replete with contemporaneous expressions that make it clear
people understood they were living through a time of critical change. Our
current moment has produced a similar sense of historic importance,
although it is still too early to see how significant a turning point we are
witnessing. Beyond that kind of visceral invocation of crisis, it is possible
to point to the depth of dislocation, the widespread nature of the resulting
social and economic change, and the duration of the realignment that
follows, as guideposts. 74 Again, it is not necessary to resolve this here, but
it is important to acknowledge that it may be more a question of degree than
kind to identify particularly significant examples of crisis.
Indeed, in important respects, these moments of crisis seem less to
represent fundamental realignments in the way that Ackerman describes his
examples of popular constitutional amendment (however contested), and
Grant Gilmore his ages of American law, although they do at times take
place in the context of larger legal change that filters through to property
doctrine. 75 What they represent more immediately are times when
seemingly settled questions about the balance of individual autonomy and
state authority, the role of the state in regulating property, and the role of
property in social ordering rise to the cultural and legal surface. These
times of uncertainty provoke anxiety and ferment in general, but
particularly about the nature of ownership itself. Although time and again
the pendulum seems to swing back toward more privatized visions of
76
property, the residue of crisis remains.
73. Cf Claire Priest, Creatingan American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in

American History, 120 HARV. L. REv. 385 (2006) (examining colonial American legal
developments transforming real property's use as security for debts).
74. Cf Lovett, supra note 53, at 471-74 (discussing the nature of "radically changed
circumstances"). For a quite different perspective on regulation in a perceived permanent
state of crisis, see generally Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively DistributedCopyright Enforcement,
95 GEO. L.J. 1 (2006) (offering a number of insights about the costs and benefits of
perceiving regulation as forced by crisis, and thus limited, for example in the exploration of
alternatives and the possibilities of resistance).
75. Thus, for example, the New Deal Court's ratification of an expanded scope of
federal regulatory power has had profound effects on the operation of property law in
practice, even if that ratification operated at one step removed from most of the doctrinal
questions that frame common-law aspects of property law.
76. To the extent that moments of punctuated equilibrium in property law reflect modes
of species evolution by in fact contributing to property law's evolution-a question that we
cannot answer here-such evolution arguably occurs more in the form of new institutional
approaches to core tensions in property theory than in any particular doctrinal developments.
Several observations follow from this claim that will be explored in greater depth below. See
infra Part III. First, because of the oppositional nature of these basic property tensions, such
evolution appears to be more cyclical in nature than linear, a process in which competing
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II. THE GREAT RECESSION: HOUSING CRISIS, ECONOMIC SHOCK, AND
EMERGING RESPONSE

Government owning a stake in any private U.S. company is objectionable
to most Americans-me included.
77
- Former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson

Like many prior dislocations, the current economic crisis seems
foreseeable in retrospect. As of yet, however, it is not clear what
combination of regulatory interventions and market corrections will be
required to return to something resembling normality. The centrality of
property in the current crisis, both in its origins and in the emerging
response, assures that this crisis is a significant property moment.
Overarching the many intricate modes of property's entanglement with the
crisis are three core assumptions about property:
that widespread
homeownership is a paramount objective; that credit should be widely
accessible at all societal levels, partly as a means to accomplish that
objective; and that ownership opportunities in the secondary market for
mortgage-backed securities are also imperative, partly as a means to ensure
the availability of credit.
In this part, we describe the events that contributed to and comprised the
current crisis, which began with a housing bubble in the early part of this
decade, imploded in the meltdown of the subprime mortgage markets, and
then extended to financial markets throughout the world. We then describe
the still-evolving regulatory response, including recent initiatives by both
the executive and legislative branches to contain the crisis. Finally, we
recount briefly property's multiscalar involvement in the current property
moment.
A. The Crisis: Subprime Mortgages, CreditLockups, and the Global
Slowdown
The current economic crisis--dubbed by many as the "Great
Recession"-took shape throughout much of the decade, a period in which
innovations in the credit market for housing fueled a major housing bubble.
The causes of the crisis will likely be disputed for some time as
commentators use different analytical and normative perspectives to
diagnose its predicates. Some have focused on one or a few determinants,

norms revolve around and incrementally shape the most basic assumptions about property
rights and ownership. Second, the consistency in these basic assumptions, from crisis to
crisis, likely reveals as much about property's evolution as the different institutional
arrangements resulting from temporary resolutions of the core tensions. Finally, each crisis
leaves its own unique residue, often in redefining the ways in which we preserve our most
basic assumptions about property law, rather than in redefining those assumptions.
77. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M.
Paulson, Jr. on Actions To Protect the U.S. Economy (Oct. 14, 2008),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpl205.htm.
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such as the startling decline in home values in 2007,78 systemic failures to
assess risk, 79 or the illusion of liquidity. 80 Others have described the crisis
as a "perfect storm." 8 1 In this Article, we adopt a descriptive perspective,
disassociated from direct questions of prescription and prevention. Our
purpose in this section is to use a wide-angle lens in chronicling the events
leading up to the crisis as necessary groundwork for understanding the role
82
of property in this crisis.
Although the origins of the crisis run deep, it is useful to begin with the
Federal Reserve's interest rate responses after the dot-com crash in the early
part of this millennium. As mortgage interest rates fell, credit began to flow
to housing consumers. The Bush Administration's policy focus on what it
described as an "ownership society," favorable economic conditions, and
innovations within the housing and mortgage industry produced an
environment in which underwriting standards dropped and borrowers with
83
lower incomes and riskier profiles received financing.
"Subprime" lending-a category that defies easy definition, but generally
involves higher risk loans and less creditworthy borrowers 84-increased
significantly, peaking in 2006 at over $600 billion in originations.8 5 In
marked contrast with loans in the "prime" mortgage market, subprime and
"Alt-A" loan instruments included "exotic" terms such as higher loan-to78. Christopher L. Foote et al., Subprime Facts: What (We Think) We Know About the
Subprime Crisis and What We Don't 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston Pub. Policy Discussion
Papers, Paper No. 08-2, 2008), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-l 153411.
79. Schwarcz, supra note 52; see also John B. Taylor, The FinancialCrisis and the
Policy Responses: An EmpiricalAnalysis of What Went Wrong 27 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate
Governance Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 30, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1341170 (arguing that "government actions and interventions"
prolonged the crisis by "misdiagnosing the problems in the bank credit markets and thereby
responding inappropriately by focusing on liquidity rather than risk").
80. Anastasia Nesvetailova, The End of a Great Illusion: Credit Crunch and Liquidity
Meltdown (Danish Inst. for Int'l Studies, Working Paper No. 2008/23, 2008), available at
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications[WP2008/WP2008-23_CreditCrunch and_
LiquidityMeltdown.pdf.
81. See, e.g., Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard,
57 UCLAL. REv. 183,204-05 (2009).
82. In doing so, we do not claim, nor even seek, to be comprehensive. Rather, we touch
on only the most salient forces and events that shaped the crisis.
83. See Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007, at 5-7 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt. and Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 08-24, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1255362. For one of many attempts to
catalog the factors that led to the creation and expansion of the subprime market, see, for
example, BARTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 46-56.
84. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of PredatoryLending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1261 (2002). Subprime and "AltA" loans are marked in the industry by some general characteristics, including lower
borrower FICO scores, borrower credit problems, and failure to conform to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac underwriting standards. See Gorton, supra note 83, at 8.
85. L. Randall Wray, Lessons from the Subprime Meltdown 30 (The Levy Econ. Inst. of
Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 522, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1070833;
see also Gorton, supra note 83, at 3 ("Subprime mortgage origination in 2005 and 2006 was
about $1.2 trillion of which 80 percent was securitized." (citing MAJORITY STAFF OF THE J.
ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS 18 fig.8 (2007))).
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value ratios, teaser interest rates for the first two or three years, and interestonly and payment-option adjustable-rate mortgages. 86 Concomitantly with
the loosening of underwriting standards, underwriting processes in the
subprime market also changed. This resulted most paradigmatically in the
advent of "no-doc" and "low-doc" loans, which contributed materially to
the mind-boggling level of fraudulent practices among real estate and
mortgage brokers in the subprime market. 87
These alterations in
underwriting standards and practices diverged sharply from the
standardized lending norms established during the New Deal, many88 of
which had contributed to the development of a stable secondary market.
As housing prices rose in markets across the country and homebuilders
turned deserts into cities seemingly overnight, the cycle of borrowing was
fueled by increasingly sophisticated securitizations. 89 A robust market in
residential mortgage-backed securities had existed for at least two
decades. 90 In the early part of this millennium, subprime-mortgage-backed
securities joined the secondary market. 9 1 In contrast to its long experience
with the traditional loan terms that still largely characterize prime lending,
the industry had no experience in valuing the risks associated with the
92
exotic loan terms underlying subprime-mortgage-backed securities.
Moreover, the market participants best positioned to value risk had little
incentive to do so, thanks to an incentive structure in which mortgage
originators received higher fees for imposing more onerous terms on
borrowers, but then sold the loans and often also the servicing function to
third parties. 9 3 Nonetheless, it appears that the most exotic were also the
86. For examples and descriptions, see NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSURES:
DEFENSES, WORKOUTS, AND MORTGAGE SERVICING 11-13 (2d ed. 2007); Allan N. Krinsman,

Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How Did It Happen and How Will It End?, J. STRUCTURED
FIN., Summer 2007, at 13, 14-15; Gorton, supra note 83, at 12-19; Wray, supra note 85, at
30-31. As recent studies have documented, a number of these innovations were associated
with predatory behavior, such as equity stripping. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HouS. & URBAN
DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 31

(2000), availableat http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf.
87. See Subprime Mortgage Lending Problems in Context: Hearing on Subprime and
PredatoryLending Before the H. Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions and Consumer Credit
Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 4-5 (2007) (statement of Alex J. Pollock,
Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute); Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The
Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, ECON. LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas, Dallas,
Tex.), Nov. 2007, at 1, 2-5; Krinsman, supra note 86, at 14-15; Wray, supra note 85, at 21.
For a discussion of the racial impact of subprime lending practices, see Carol Necole Brown,
Intent and Empirics: Race to the Subprime, 93 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
88. L. Randall Wray, Lessons from the Subprime Meltdown, CHALLENGE, Mar.-Apr.
2008, at 40, 63-64 (2008); see also Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the CapitalMarkets on
Real EstateLaw and Practice,32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 270-76 (1999).
89. See generally Levitin, supra note 11.
90. See Malloy, supra note 28, at 992-99; Schill, supra note 28, at 1271-72.
91. Wray, supra note 88, at 43-48.
92. DiMartino & Duca, supra note 87, at 4; Wray, supra note 85, at 22-23; see also
Gorton, supranote 83, at 49-61.
93. See Wray, supra note 88, at 46-47; see also Charles D. Anderson et al.,
Deconstructing a Mortgage Meltdown: A Methodology for Decomposing Underwriting
Quality (May 29, 2009) (unpublished article), available at http://ssm.con/abstract-1411782.
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most securitized. 94 Another unique feature of subprime securitizations95was
the reliance on housing market appreciation for their underlying value.
In late 2006, two events interrupted the uninhibited and seemingly
limitless expansion of the primary and secondary mortgage markets: the
rise in interest rates and the flattening (and in some areas of the country,
decline) of home values. 96 The consequence was what would turn out to be
only the first wave of interest rate resets, mortgage defaults, and
97
foreclosures.
Responses from lenders appeared to cover the spectrum and many of the
details remain unclear. Some tightened underwriting requirements; 98 others
appeared to loosen them even further.99 What is clear is that by mid-2007,
secondary-market investors had begun to lose confidence. 10 0 Faced with
the inability to sell loans in short order in the secondary market, subprime
lenders originated fewer loans.' 0 ' The slowdown in the primary market
was exacerbated by increasing demands among secondary-market investors
that subprime lenders buy back some of the riskiest securities.' 0 2 By late
2007, credit markets began to tighten, some home lenders, including
Countrywide Financial, began to experience significant losses, and more
than twenty subprime lenders had already filed for bankruptcy or gone out
of business.' 03 Meanwhile, another wave of interest rate resets and defaults
hit. 10 4 As foreclosures reached historic highs, a record that would be

94. According to Randall Wray,
So-called liar loans increased from a quarter of subprimes in 2001 to 40% in 2006.
... The percent of [subprime] loans with adjustable rates rose from about 74% in
2001 to more than 93% in 2005; interest-only loans rose from zero to nearly 38%
over the same period; and the low or no doc share rose from 29% to more than
half. Data provided by the JEC shows that over the same period, hybrid adjustable
rate mortgages (those with teaser rates for 2 or 3 years, after which loans would be
reset at higher rates) rose from just under 60% of securitized subprimes in 2001 to
nearly three-quarters by 2004. In other words, the riskiest types of subprimesARMS and hybrid ARMS-were favorites with securitizers.
Wray, supra note 85, at 30-31 (citations omitted).
95. See DiMartino & Duca, supra note 87, at 4; Gorton, supra note 83, at 12, 19.
96. BARTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 73-74.

97. Id. at 74-99.
98. DiMartino & Duca, supra note 87, at 5; Gorton, supra note 83, at 51.
99. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and
17,
2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
Competition
(May
bernanke20070517a.htm.
100. DiMartino & Duca, supra note 87, at 5-6.
101. Krinsman, supra note 86, at 16-17.
102. See id. at 16.
103. See Leslie Earnest, Pink Slips Litter Loan Industry: The Turmoil in the Sub-prime
Mortgage Sector Hits Some Workers As Hard As Borrowers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2007, at
A
Timeline,
Crisis:
The
Subprime
Cl;
Knowledge@Wharton,
(last visited
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/special-sections/subprime/timeline.cfm#
Feb. 5, 2010); see also Krinsman, supra note 86, at 16.
104. BARTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 135-41.
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the once-surreal possibility of
broken in early 2008,105 some lenders faced
10 6
owning homes that could not be liquidated.
The stock market started to drop in early 2008, with the year beginning
with the kind of volatility that has since come to seem normal. In March,
the Federal Reserve underwrote the takeover of Bear Steams by JPMorgan
Chase, and throughout the spring and summer some of Wall Street's largest
financial institutions were forced to write off billions of dollars in 0assets
7
related to what had become essentially worthless subprime securities. 1
In one watershed month, September 2008, the federal government placed
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conservatorships, committing up to $100
billion to each entity in the event of capital shortfalls.' 0 8 A week later,
Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch in a fire sale, and the storied firm
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.1 0 9 The next day, the Dow dropped
over 500 points, the worst loss since the aftermath of September 11,
2001.'10 On September 16, the Federal Reserve agreed to loan the thenstaggering sum of $85 billion to insurance giant American International
Group (AIG),I I a portion of which was repaid in November in the form of
the Treasury's purchase of $40 billion of preferred stock in AIG."12 On
September 25, the largest bank failure in American history occurred with
3
the emergency sale of Washington Mutual to JPMorgan Chase." 1
Over the next few months, the magnitude of the lockup of credit markets
around the world-and the resulting fallout-became clear. 114 Globally,
investors shifted investments to Treasury bills and other relatively safe
havens, thereby raising the cost of borrowing. 115 Money market funds,
traditionally the most conservative means of investment, were threatened,
with some falling below previously inviolable thresholds. 116 In late
October, currencies around the globe plummeted. 117 That same month,
105. Id. at 91, 374-86.
106. Id. at 231-48.
107. Id. at 4-5, 106, 235.

108. Id. at 253-55.
109. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Merrill Is Sold: Failing To Find Buyer, Lehman Set To
Filefor Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at Al. A week after that, Goldman Sachs

and Morgan Stanley, the two remaining major independent investment banks on Wall Street,
transformed themselves into bank holding companies. BARTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 237.
110. NYTimes.com, 10 Weeks of Financial Turmoil, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2008/09/27/business/economy/20080927_WEEKSTIMELINE.html (last visited
Feb. 5, 2010).
111. BARTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 64, 235-37.
112. Id. at 235-37. This loan has been supplemented several times.
113. Id. at 269; 10 Weeks of Financial Turmoil, supra note 110.
114. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime FinancialCrisis, 41 CONN. L. REv. 963,
967-68 (2009).
115. See BARTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 78, 352; see also Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street
Meets Main Street: Understandingthe FinancialCrisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 71-76
(2009).
116. BARTH ETAL., supra note 8, at 117.
117. Mark Landler & Vikas Bajaj, Some Currencies Plunge As Stocks Sink Worldwide,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at Al.
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unemployment in the United States reached a fourteen-year high."18 In late
January 2009, the International Labour Organization predicted that as many
as 51 million people could be unemployed in 2009 around the world.' 19
This crisis compares in scale, if not (yet) in depth, to the Great
Depression. Then, as now, the stock market plummeted, banks failed, and
20
unemployment skyrocketed after a bubble of unprecedented prosperity.
1
Then, as now, the financial crisis was international in scope. 12
B. The Emerging Response
Thus far, the federal government has responded to the meltdown with a
series of still-evolving interventions. Aimed primarily at reestablishing
liquidity and reducing panic, these regulatory moves have ranged from
purging toxic debt, to recapitalizing reluctant lending institutions, to
broadly stimulating the economy in an effort to restore some semblance of
normality. As discussed below, during late 2007 and throughout 2008,
regulators appeared to adopt an ad hoc approach of prescribing one
treatment, waiting with baited breath as the Dow reacted, and then trying
another. Since President Obama has taken office, regulatory responses have
taken on a greater level of coordination, though significant challenges
remain.
One early response to the mortgage aspects of the current crisis was the
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, which sought to promote
loan modifications as an alternative to foreclosure by reducing the negative
tax consequences associated with such modifications. 12 2 Another response,
123
after the market dropped in early 2008, was a modest stimulus package.

118. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population
Survey,

http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?datatool=latestnumbers&

seriesid=LNS14000000 (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). The November 2008 unemployment
rate was 6.9%, the highest since October 1993. Since November, unemployment rates have
steadily increased from 6.9% to 9.5% in June 2009. The highest unemployment rate since
August 1983 is 10.1%.
119. INT'L LABOUR ORG., GLOBAL EMPLOYMENT TRENDS 19 (2009), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/ampro/cinterfor/news/get_2009.pdf
120. See BARTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 144; ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME
SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT
IT 101-06 (2008); Jonathan Macey et al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets: Applying
Broker-DealerLaw to Subprime Mortgages, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 806 (2009); Moran, supra
note 115, at 76.
121. Moran, supra note 115, at 98-99 (discussing the international scope of the current
crisis); Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, The Great Depression as a Watershed:
InternationalCapitalMobility over the Long Run (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 5960, 1997), available at http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/amtaylor/

papers/w5960.pdf (discussing the international scope of the Great Depression).
122. Pub. L. No. 110-142, 121 Stat. 1803 (2007). Even prior to this time, indeed since
2006, federal bank regulators had attempted limited preventive measures, such as the
Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609 (Oct.
4, 2006).
123. Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613.
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As evidenced by the spiraling crisis that followed, both proved largely
irrelevant.
Over the summer of 2008, Congress passed the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act (HERA). 124 In a multifaceted effort to address weaknesses in
the housing market that moved well beyond the enhanced disclosures and
125
tax breaks characteristic of recent legislation targeting homeowners,
HERA authorized the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to insure
$300 billion worth of mortgages by means of voluntary refinancing, and it
also changed certain lending requirements of FHA programs. 126 The
legislation provided new oversight for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and
gave the Treasury Department authority to purchase an equity interest in
both entities. 12 7 Indeed, as noted, the new regulator used its powers to
nationalize Fannie and Freddie shortly after the bill was passed. 128 HERA
also notably required that all loan originators be licensed and registered
under a statewide29 system or, if employed by a depository institution, a
national system.1
None of these actions seemed to stem the widening credit crisis, as banks
became increasingly reluctant to loan given the uncertainty of their own
subprime-infected portfolios.
On September 18, 2008, the Bush
Administration proposed what eventually became a $700 billion bailout
package. 130 After much political wrangling-including a rejection by the
House that led to a 778-point single-day drop in the Dow-Congress passed
the bill on October 3.131
The bailout plan began with a proposal to buy up hundreds of billions of
dollars worth of distressed mortgages. The concept behind this plan was
stanching the uncertainty created out of fear of the inability to value assets
backed by this so-called "toxic" debt, which in turn was blocking
lending. 132 As the crisis spread across the globe, the Treasury shifted gears
in response to early indications that purchasing toxic debt was unlikely to
calm the markets. 133 In mid-October 2008, the Treasury announced that it
would use the almost limitless authority granted under the HERA's
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to buy up to $250 billion in bank

124. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008).
125. For an example of such a statutory effort, see the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act (HERA) of 1994, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006). HERA did in fact augment
disclosure requirements in the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, but it certainly did not
stop there. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5115 (West Supp. 2009).
126. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701, 1709, 1715z-23(m).
127. See id. §§ 1455, 1719, 4501-4526.
128. See supra text accompanying note 108.
129. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5114.
130. BARTH ETAL., supra note 8, at 257.
131. Id.; see Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765.
132. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Buying Troubled Assets, 26 YALE 1. ON REG. 343, 344-45
(2009).
133. See id. at 346-47.
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stock, thereby taking equity in a mix of large and regional banks. 134
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve and central banks around the world cut
135
interest rates.
In November 2008, Treasury Secretary Paulson changed course again,
proposing to extend his program of equity injections to include consumer
lenders, such as credit card companies, auto finance companies, and the
like. 1 36 This proposal came to fruition in the form of the Term AssetBacked Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which among other things
authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to $200
billion to holders of certain consumer and small-business loans. 137 Later
that month, the Treasury and FDIC provided $20 billion in addition to
138
guarantees and other supports to Citigroup in return for preferred stock.
One consistent point of contention throughout the early phases of the
crisis was the issue of where homeowners in financial distress fit in to the
government's response. By means of its Hope for Homeowners initiative,
the Bush Administration promoted voluntary workout efforts by lenders and
remained reluctant to directly mandate workouts.139 Although the program
initially aimed to protect several hundred thousand homeowners from
foreclosure, thus far it has helped fewer than one hundred.' 40 Perhaps in
light of the meager response to this program, in November 2008, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac temporarily suspended foreclosures on all loans
14 1
owned or securitized by Fannie Mae.
Meanwhile, in Europe, the Irish and German governments were among
those guaranteeing bank deposits, 14 2 Iceland passed legislation to
resuscitate its failing banking industry, 143 and a number of other European
countries began to nationalize their banks.' 44 In mid-October 2008, South
Korea unveiled a $130 billion plan that included state guarantees on some
134. BARTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 258-59.

135. Id. at 244-48; see also Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Selected Interest Rates,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h 15/data.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
136. BARTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 240.
137. Id.

138. Id. at 261, 306.
139. Id. at 252.
140. Id.; see also Brian Grow et al., The Home Foreclosure Fiasco: How the Banking
Industry Is Undermining Efforts To Keep People in Their Houses, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 23,

2009, at 34, 36 ("Hope for Homeowners-which Bush officials and banks promised last fall
would shield 400,000 families from foreclosure-has so far produced only 25 refinanced
loans.").
141. Press Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae To Suspend Foreclosures Until January
2009 While Streamlined Modification Program Is Implemented (Nov. 20, 2008),
http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2008/4531 .jhtml;jsessionid=I4GW4PZTD2WBDJ
2FQSHSFGI?p=Media&s=News+Releases.
142. Sebastian Schich, FinancialCrisis: Deposit Insurance and Related FinancialSafety
Net Aspects, FIN. MARKET TRENDS,
Dec. 2008, at 1,
15, available at

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/48/41894959.pdf.
143. Id.
144. See,

e.g.,

Timeline:

Credit

Crunch

to

Downturn,

BBC

NEWS,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7521250.stm (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) (explaining that on
September 29, 2008, "the mortgage lender Bradford & Bingley is nationalised").
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bank debt and other capital supports, 145 followed by China, which in
November announced a $586 billion two-year economic stimulus
46
package. 1
In mid-January 2009, at President-Elect Obama's request, President Bush
submitted a request to Congress for the remaining $350 billion in TARP
funding.' 4 7 In mid-February, the Federal Reserve Board announced that
$100 billion of these funds would be used to expand TALF to as much as
$1 trillion, with a particular focus on stimulating economic growth among
households and small businesses. 14 8 This initiative is part of the current
administration's multipronged Financial Stability Plan, which includes 149a
"Financial Stability Trust" and a "Public-Private Investment Fund."'
Prominently among the supports offered by the Trust is a capital assistance
program, which provides preferred stock, convertible to common stock, in
return for capital, as well as a mandatory "stress test" for major banking
institutions and the promise of greater coordination among the key
regulatory agencies. 150 Meanwhile, the public-private investment fund is
intended to include private capital alongside public funds for bailing out
troubled banks. 151
President Obama has thus far departed rather decidedly from his
predecessor's position on consumers and homeowners.
His
administration's Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan (HASP)
envisions helping at least seven million families modify or refinance their
mortgages. The plan seeks to accomplish these measures by means of a
mix of mandates and incentives, including promised opportunities to
145. Addressing the Impact of the Global FinancialCrisis on Asia-Pacific Economies,
MACROECONOMIC POL'Y BRIEF (Econ. and Soc. Survey Comm'n for Asia and the Pac.,
Bangkok, Thail.), Dec. 2008, at 1, 3; see also BARTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 285.
146. Dawn Holland et al., The World Economy: Economic Downturn in Asia, NAT'L

INST. ECON. REV., Jan. 2009, at 23, 23; Christopher A. McNally, China and the Global
Financial Crisis,
ASIA
PAC.
BULL.,
Dec.
12,
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/apb026.pdf,

2008,
available
at
Sherle R. Schwenninger,

How To Save the World, WORLD POL'Y J., Winter 2008/09, at 3, 10.
147. See Press Release, George W. Bush, U.S. President, Message to the Congress of the

United
States
(Jan.
12,
2009),
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2009/01/20090112-7.html. The most recent planned uses of Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) funds are for foreclosure relief, capital for small banks, and
increased Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) funding. Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Department Releases Text of Letter from Secretary Geithner to
Hill Leadership on Administration's Exit Strategy for TARP (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/pr_12092009.html.
148. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Is
Prepared To Expand the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) (Feb. 10,
2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/200902 1Ob.htm.
149. In connection with this initiative, the Obama Administration established a publicly
accessible website providing information about the new programs as well as opportunities to
track public expenses in connection with the program. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
FACT SHEET: FINANCIAL STABILITY PLAN, available at http://www.financialstability.gov/
docs/fact-sheet.pdf.

150. Id. at 2-3.
151. Id. at 3.
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refinance loans owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac,
mandated reductions in interest rates, 152 matching funds for this purpose,
and financial incentives to lenders to modify terms and to borrowers to
comply with terms. 153 Notably, the plan also provides $1.5 billion in
relocation funds to renters displaced by foreclosure and $2 billion in
"neighborhood stabilization" funds.154
In May 2009, Congress
supplemented these efforts by passing the Helping Families Save Their
Homes Act, 155 which requires successors in interest of foreclosed properties
to honor the lease terms of renters and, in the case of month-to-month
tenancies, to provide at least a ninety-day pre-eviction notice. Finally,
President Obama has proposed a new consumer financial protection agency,
which would regulate the sale of consumer credit by testing the safety of
consumer loans much as toasters and other consumer products are currently
56
tested. 1
On February 17, President Obama signed into law the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,157 a $787 billion package,
approximately one-third of which took the form of tax cuts, many of them
for middle-class taxpayers. The Act also provides financial aid to states,
and financial incentives for home purchases as well as basic consumer
purchases. 158 In addition, in mid-2009, the administration announced a new
plan aimed at giving greater regulatory oversight to the Federal Reserve,
particularly for the purpose of monitoring systemic risk, and also proposing
to coordinate the oversight of the disparate financial regulators at the
federal level. 159 On the international front, the Group of 20 pledged in a
financial reform
September 2009 meeting to devise regulations for global
160
aimed at greater coordination at an international level.

152. Such reductions are to last for a period of five years. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE
4, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/homeowner-affordability-plan/FactSheet.pdf.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 7. The plan also seeks to bolster confidence in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
by means of additional preferred stock purchase agreements.
155. Pub. L. No. 111-22, §§ 702-703, 123 Stat. 1632, 1660-62 (2009) (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5220 note; 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7)).
156. Zachary A. Goldfarb et al., U.S. May Add New Financial Watchdog: Consumer
Agency Under Consideration,WASH. POST, May 20, 2009, at Al; see also Adam J. Levitin,
The Consumer Financial Protection Agency (Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers,
Research Paper No. 1447082, 2009), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract= 1447082.
157. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
158. See id.
159. Timothy Geithner & Lawrence Summers, A New Financial Foundation, WASH.
POST, June 15, 2009, at Al5. In the same month, the Securities and Exchange Commission
proposed new rules to reduce the risk in money market funds. Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, SEC Proposes Rule Amendments To Strengthen Regulatory Framework for
Money Market Funds (June 24, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-142.htm.
160. Edmund L. Andrews, Leaders of G-20 Vow To Reshape Global Economy, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2009, at Al.
TREASURY, HOMEOWNER AFFORDABILITY AND STABILITY PLAN: FACT SHEET
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Thus far, President Obama's responses to the crisis have been
compared-and contrasted-with New Deal-era regulation. 16 1 The recent
legislation includes public works projects, though these efforts are less
massive and certainly less iconic than Franklin D. Roosevelt's. It seems
possible that President Obama's carrot-and-stick approach to loan
modifications could evolve into a New Deal-style overhaul of the mortgage
finance market. Apt also are the comparisons between the two sets of
regulatory initiatives aimed at the banking system's recovery. In both eras,
federal financing is assumed to be the linchpin in restoring liquidity and
trust in the banks. 162 As in the comparisons between the originators of the
crisis, the most telling comparisons are at the most abstract level. As
commentators have recognized time and again, not since the New Deal has
the government spent so much money, nor intervened so intrusively, in the
private sectors of banking and finance.
C. IsolatingProperty in This Moment
Every bursting economic bubble-from tulips to dot-coms-implicates
property, but the current crisis originates more than most in core aspects of
our system of property. The run-up to the crisis grew fairly directly from
ownership of that most iconic of possessions, the home. Powerful and, in
hindsight, overblown rhetoric combined with a complex business and
regulatory infrastructure, all firmly grounded in property, to produce a spike
in subprime lending as a means to the imperative of homeownership. The
result was a corresponding proliferation of subprime residential mortgagebacked securities and the downstream financial structures that fueled, and
were fueled by, a housing bubble. Perhaps most poignantly, the crisis arose
in an important sense from the quest for ownership rights by those with
lower incomes or who were otherwise on the margins of homeownership
and access.
Consider first the rising rhetoric of property rights that grew more
prominent in the years preceding the crisis. Notable cultural signposts
include the aftermath of Kelo v. New London, 163 and President Bush's
championing of the "ownership society."' 164 In a sweeping statement about
161. For a general discussion of the similarities between the New Deal and Obama's
stimulus strategies, see generally Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Obama's Big Deal; The 2009
Federal Stimulus; Labor and Employment Law at the Crossroads, 33 RUTGERS L. REc. 1

(2009).
162. Tim Reid, Barack Obama Reveals Stimulus Package That Could Exceed $1 Trillion,
TIMES ONLINE (U.K.), Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
us and americas/uselections/article5303652.ece.
163. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For commentary on Kelo v. New London's aftermath, see D.
Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006); David A.
Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the PoorAfter Kelo, 101 Nw. U. L.
REV. 365 (2007); George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic
Development: ForgoingIneffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School
Districts, 83 TuL. L. REV. 45 (2008).
164. See, e.g., Warren Vieth, Bush Makes His Pitchfor 'Ownership Society,' L.A. TIMES,

Sept. 5, 2004, at A25.
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the manifold benefits of property ownership, he proclaimed, "'Ownership
brings security and dignity and independence ....[W]e seek to provide
not just a government program, but a path-a path to greater opportunity,
more freedom and more control over your own life.' ' 165 The "ownership
society" campaign generated a host of federal policies seeking to promote
homeownership and access to credit, including down-payment assistance
programs,166 increased investment by the government-sponsored entities in
168
the secondary market, 16 7 and tax relief for homeowners.
Equally important, and more hidden thus far, is the role of property in the
intricate business and regulatory infrastructure in which the crisis
fermented. Basic assumptions about land and ownership lay at the heart of
a significant number of seemingly inconsequential business and legal
decisions. One of many examples is the systemwide assumption (again,
erroneous in hindsight) that property values would continue indefinitely to
appreciate. On this basis, subprime lenders provided exotic new adjustablerate mortgages, relaxed loan-to-value ratios, and changed other traditional
loan terms, reasoning that at worst borrowers could refinance on the basis
of the increased equity in their homes. 169 Similarly, intermediaries and
investors in the secondary market for subprime mortgages assumed that
rising property values would offset the higher risk of defaults associated
with such mortgages. 170 Indeed, early analysis already hints at a connection
between the illiquidity that the market has recently experienced and the
71
inaccurate predictions about land valuation inherent in credit ratings.'
Meanwhile, federal regulators accepted, or at a minimum failed to question,
the risk models circulated by industry players, which implicitly assumed
that the unprecedented bubble in housing prices would not burst-at least
72
not suddenly, dramatically, or pervasively.'
The recent controversy over the role of the Mortgage Electronic
Registration System (MERS) encapsulates another set of foundational
property assumptions, this time forced by the crisis into conflict with the
165. Id.
166. Id.; Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Hosts
Conference on Minority Homeownership (Oct. 15, 2002), http://www.policyalmanac.org/
socialwelfare/archive/wh_minorityhousing.shtml.
167. Vieth, supra note 164; Press Release, White House, supra note 166.
168. Vieth, supra note 164. For a theoretical discussion of the ownership society as a
policy undertaking, see Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means:
Values, Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary

American "Ownership Society," 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 45 (2005) and Joseph William Singer,
The Ownership Society and Takings of Property:

Castles, Investments, and Just

Obligations,30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 309, 310-11 (2006).
169. DiMartino & Duca, supra note 87, at 3-4; Gorton, supra note 83, at 3, 7, 12.
170. Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee

Approachfor Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1011, 1045 (2009); DiMartino
& Duca, supra note 87, at 4; Wray, supra note 85, at 20-21 (intermediaries had no incentive
to look more carefully). Certainly, it appears that one of the core features of predatory
lending, asset-based lending, arose from this basic assumption about property values.
171. Nesvetailova, supra note 80, at 15-16.
172. See Wray, supra note 88, at 57.
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increasing abstraction and fragmentation of ownership spawned by
securitization. The controversy has been generated primarily by claims of
defendants in foreclosure cases that MERS is not the "owner" in any
meaningful sense of the mortgages at issue. 173 In Arizona, for example, a
number of lawsuits were filed against MERS and the owners of mortgage
loans for whom MERS was acting as a nominee, alleging fraud and
174
conspiracy to hide the true identity of the owners from borrowers.
Similarly, a federal district judge in Ohio dismissed fourteen foreclosure
cases filed by Deutsche Bank on the ground that the bank, which had
acquired the mortgages on the secondary market, failed to prove it owned
the notes and mortgages. 75 In a number of these cases, courts have
responded to the ethereal and fragmented nature of ownership by reverting
to and reasserting older norms of ownership. A typical response, for
example, has been to resort to the land registry, which is so deeply
connected to the location of physical property, as the most conclusive
determinant of ownership. 176 In these cases, the crisis has brought a stark
clash between basic property assumptions about how ownership is proven.
Equally striking is the ultimate vindication of a traditional, physicalist
ownership as finally settling the matter.
Thus far, the response to the crisis has been heavily saturated with
property references, some familiar and some new and evolving. From
HERA in the summer of 2008 to President Obama's HASP of early 2009,
in the form of taking stock in Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and a growing
circle of lenders, the federal government has acted on and through property.
As the crisis continues, in symbiotic fashion, the regulatory response has
left its mark on property and property has left its mark on the regulatory
response, marks to which we will now turn.
III.

PROPERTY IN CRISIS

No two crises in our history have been exactly alike, although some
echoes recur with eerie similarity-the bursting of seemingly irrational
economic bubbles, chronicles of financial deaths that in hindsight could
have been foretold, and broad regulatory and cultural changes that never
completely solve underlying structural problems.
The current crisis
173. See, e.g., Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009); see also

Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage
Electronic Registration System 16-22 (Oct. 5, 2009) (unpublished article), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract- 1469749.
174. JPMDL Centralizes Conspiracy, Fraud Suits Against MERS in Arizona Federal
Court, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: MORTGAGE LENDING, Dec. 2009, at 22.
175. In re Foreclosure Cases, No. 07-2282, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84011 (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 31, 2007); see also Gretchen Morgenson, ForeclosuresHit a Snag for Lenders, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at Cl. As is standard in the securitization process, Deutsche Bank
likely never received the physical notes, but rather only evidence that these instruments had
been sent to a repository for safekeeping. Morgenson, supra.
176. Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.

CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1354 (1982) ("Land is an obvious candidate for recordation because it is
permanent and in one location.").
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recapitulates elements of many earlier crises. But our current moment,
perhaps more than many past crises, is deeply evocative of tensions in how
we think about property, particularly along the perennial fault lines often
reduced to the public/private divide.
This part accordingly examines the relationship between property and the
current crisis from three different perspectives. First, it explores the ways
in which this crisis has affected our understanding of the design of property
law. In doing so, we evoke traditional property norms that have in one way
or another gained vitality in the reflected light of the crisis. Each of these
177
norms is a particular manifestation of theoretical tensions outlined above.
In crisis, some norms have been destabilized, or have become less obvious.
Others have been legitimized or have become more compelling. And some
appear to have served unusual goals in the heat of perceived catastrophe.
The purpose here, in short, is to begin to understand what the crisis reveals
about the contemporary expression of long-standing fault lines in the
discourse of property.
Next, this part turns to the relationship between property and this crisis
from the opposite direction. Here, the emphasis is on the varied roles that
property has played in shaping regulatory responses to the crisis.
Particularly, the part lays out the construction of these same property norms
into a disjointed and evolving-but also specific and expansiveengagement with fault lines in property law. This reveals a momentary,
partial, and unstable resolution of theoretical tensions in the property
discourse of this crisis.
Finally, this part tenders reflections in broader terms about what the fire
this time reveals. The undertaking here is to sift the emerging residue of
crisis to start to discern the lasting impact of this particular property
moment on property's pressure points. Ultimately, this examination may
help guide those engaged in the ongoing normative effort to understand that
the question is not whether the state is destroying private property in order
to save it, but rather whether current readjustments to the public/private
divide make pragmatic sense and will actually respond to the crisis.
A. Crisis as an Influence on the Design ofProperty
While the current crisis speaks volumes about the general cultural
valence of property, it also puts great pressure on several fundamental
Many events, legal and cultural, influence the
property norms.
development of property. 178 Certain decisions, such as the Supreme
Court's reaffirmation of long-standing eminent domain doctrine in Kelo v.

177. See supra Part I.A.
178. Cf William W. Fisher III, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings
Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1774, 1776 (1988) (discussing the importance of

understanding "dominant social expectations" about property as an influence on theories of
takings).
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New London, strike particularly strong popular chords. 179 Economic and
social crises tend to generate a more diffuse discourse, with property as just
one element of a larger conversation about the nature of the market and the
role of the state, but such moments nonetheless can shed significant light
about recurring anxieties that uncertainty about property can generate.
Accordingly, this section plumbs how property norms can be understood
in the reflected light of the current crisis. In particular, the crisis is actively
revealing the interconnected nature of property as against isolationist
visions. The crisis is likewise highlighting the ways in which the design of
property is sensitive to egalitarian concerns in light of a culture that for too
long has associated the institution with unfettered opportunity. And the
crisis strongly reinforces the role of the state, both in leavening the risk
associated with reward in the discourse of property as well as in setting the
terms of ownership, at times coercively. As we shall see, these deep
property norms in the flux of crisis correlate with points in the
public/private debate, while also invoking new questions about property's
localism and incrementalism.
1. Isolation Versus Interconnection
To begin, the crisis has underscored what might be considered the unity
of property, a unity emphasized in theoretical terms by both social relations,
as well as ecological conceptions of property. "Unity of property" here
refers not to Richard Epstein's use of the term "unity of ownership" to
describe the coalescence of property rights into a reductive practical
bundle, 180 but rather to a notion of property as "context and relativity,...
accommodation and community."' 8 1 Conceptually, this is a central strand
of the debate between Lockean-individualist and more communitarian,
proprietarian visions of property.' 8 2 In this context, the debate plays out
between a kind of physicalized Blackstonian isolation as a descriptive and
normative baseline, 183 and conceptions of property that stress holistic
interconnection. 184

179. See, e.g., Jeannie Suk, Taking the Home, 20 LAW & LITERATURE 291, 294 (2008)
(discussing public outcry following the Kelo decision).
180. Cf RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN 58-62 (1985).
181. Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN.

L. REV. 1529,1530 (1989).
182. See supra Part I.A.

183. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719
(2004).
184. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings, PrivateProperty and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J.

149, 152 (1971) ("Particular parcels are tied to one another in complex ways, and property is
more accurately described as being inextricably part of a network of relationships that is
neither limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property boundaries with which the legal
system is accustomed to dealing."). For further discussion of the social-relations aspects of
this interconnected conception of property, see Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative
Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 771-73 (2009).
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On one level, the unity of property revealed by the current crisis is
eminently practical. Land is tied to debt; debt is tied to complex financial
instruments like mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations; those instruments are tied to personal holdings for investors.
When one thread in this web becomes "toxic"--to use a way of describing
debt that has entered the popular consciousness in this crisis 185-the entire
interrelated system can be compromised. Retirees in Arizona see the value
of their 401(k)s evaporate because of lending practices in Maine and
appetite for debt tranches in Bahrain.
At a more local level, the crisis is demonstrating the broad consequences
of our neighbors' debts-a view of property that transcends the
externalities-driven focus of the isolationist conception. We have always
known that foreclosures, as devastating as they might be for an individual
borrower in immediate terms, have an impact on neighbors. This is a
"spillover," in the classic sense, but still fairly localized. As the scale of
foreclosures has reached levels not seen since the Great Depression,
however, entire communities are being devastated. 186 In the light of crisis,
the interdependence of the value of individual property holding becomes
inescapable.
From a legal perspective, seemingly minor changes can cascade in terms
of the social impact of property. Everything from whether subprime debt
can be collateralized, to the spiral engendered by a district court ruling that
the holder of mortgage-backed securities could not foreclose because of the
structure of the intermediaries, to the incentives that regulators allow for
mortgage origination can combine to create and undermine global markets.
Yet there is also a tension inherent in the current vibrations caused by
property losses: even while the average American cannot ignore the impact
of the crisis on her retirement account, commentators voice populist
exhortations to homeowners to accept responsibility for their irrational prior
acts of indulgence.' 87 A populist devotion to the isolationist view of
ownership and its consequences still remains, indeed perhaps becomes even
more shrill during this and other times of crisis.
2. Opportunity Versus Egalitarianism
A second, normative debate brought to the fore in the current crisis is the
image of property in service of opportunity on the one hand, and of
egalitarianism and material redistribution on the other hand. American
185. The current crisis has spawned a host of neologisms that seem destined to enter our
lexicon in its wake. See William Safire, On Language: Toxic Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 14. One can add, to cite another example, the "bad bank," a
regulatory device under discussion that would purchase those toxic debts. See Deborah
Feb. 9, 2009, at Al.
Solomon & Damian Paletta, Bank Bailout Plan Revamped, WALL ST. J.,
186. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Almost Entire Town Is Drowning in Debt As Home Values

Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, at Al.
187. See, e.g., C. S. & G. L., MSNBC Twice Aired Santelli's Criticism of Administration
ForeclosurePlan Without Substantive Response, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM., Feb. 20, 2009,

http://mediamatters.org/research/200902200016.
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property law has generally privileged the inchoate promise that property
ownership leads to ever greater opportunities-for wealth, income, and
other rewards. This orientation elevates certain policy choices. For
example, as some observers of American law and policy have noted
approvingly, 188 the property-as-opportunity paradigm permeates regulatory
support for transactions in credit and other opportunities to leverage assets
such as one's home. The connotation is that the "right" to assume debt
89
must be preserved as a means of leveraging opportunity.1
Indeed, the hyperexpansive layering of securities and credit transactions
on the residential real estate market is a reminder that the oldest and most
traditional objects of property remain foundational as potential sources of
market access at a time when scholars are increasingly announcing the
ascendancy of various "modern" forms of property. 190 In this crisis, the
humble single-family house-so venerated in our culture in contemporary
suburban echo to the Jeffersonian tradition of the yeoman farmer and even
older echo of the cultural power of land-turns out to be central to the
entire global economy.191
This opportunity-enhancing viewpoint generates a corresponding stake in
the infrastructural public/private debate. The role of both market and state
in protecting property rights is to protect access to ownership opportunities,
in the classically liberal or neoliberal sense of regulating in the event of
market failure. 19 2 As constitutional drafters in other parts of the world
make markedly different choices about positive rights in recognition of
explicit distributional objectives, 193 the American standard has remained
reactive rather than prospective, incremental rather than all-inclusive.
Yet as the current crisis has deepened, it has exposed the drawbacks of
conceptualizing property as the locus for primarily individual opportunity.
188. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL:
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).

WHY CAPITALISM

189. Indeed, in the globalizing trend toward increased rights to credit, the founder of the
Grameen Bank, who recently won the Nobel Peace Price, has repeatedly declared that

"credit is a fundamental human right." See Randeep Ramesh, 'Credit Is a Basic Human
Right,' GUARDIAN WKLY. (U.K.), Jan. 5, 2007, at 28.
190. See, e.g., Scott R. Cleere, Intellectual Property: The Capitalof the Information Age,
ADVOCATE, June 2005, at 10; Lee G. Meyer, Intellectual Property in Today's Financing
Market, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2000, at 20.

191. Perhaps the most obvious lesson for property scholars that the current crisis evinces
is the tenacity of certain reflexive images of property in the private realm. It may be that our
supposed service economy was, until the current crisis, increasingly creating wealth out of
ever-more-creative financial structures, and it is certainly true that property now extends to
even the most abstract and novel of creations. See, e.g., Joshua A. T. Fairfield, Virtual
Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047 (2005). Our point is not that traditional forms of property
are on some pragmatic or normative metric more important than intellectual property or
other emerging property types. It is instead an observation that, in an era in which
intangibles and intellectual property dominate the discourse, this crisis reminds us that the
most traditional forms of property-indeed, land-remain important.
192. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 11819(2004).

193. In this regard, compare the South African Constitution with our own. S. AFR. CONST.
1996, ch. 2, § 25.
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Given the extent to which the crisis has touched so many people's
retirement accounts, savings, and investments-not to mention homes, jobs,
and schools-the distributional consequences of crisis are difficult to
ignore. It has also become clear that spreading opportunity widely can
result in widespread pain and loss. The recent scholarly discussions of
property as a tool of egalitarianism, "human flourishing," and "development
and dignity" provide a rich basis for elaborating alternatives to the negativerights-focused orientation of property as opportunity. 194 Some of these
conceptions view property law as the appropriate mechanism for
conceptions of
elucidating a framework that recognizes "moral and political
1 95
just social relationships, just distribution, and democracy."
Even while almost instinctively adhering to the negative image of
"redistributionist," the public discourse also has begun to contemplate the
possibility that the government ought to prevent such losses from being
suffered again. Indeed, the current administration's most recent initiatives
over government's role in establishing a
suggest a serious deliberation
96
distributional baseline.'
3. Security and Insecurity, Risk and Reward
A third, and closely related, tension in conceptions of property that the
current crisis has put into stark relief is the role of property as a repository
for investment, in the classic sense of either reward for labor or security of
expectation.' 97 The classical liberal emphasis on individual labor retains
deep cultural relevance in the reflexive preference for market mechanisms
that supposedly price risk accurately, and a corresponding conception of
property as the locus of residual value. 19 8 The current crisis-and
194. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94

CORNELL

L.

REV. 743, 743-44 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander et al., A Statement of ProgressiveProperty];

see also Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Pefialver, Properties of Community, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127 (2009); Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L.

REV. 821 (2009).
195. Alexander et al., A Statement of ProgressiveProperty,supra note 194, at 743.
196. One undertaking of this Article is to complicate our understanding of the crisis by
examining the connections between regulatory and market failures, on the one hand, and
overreaching and downright naivet6 by home buyers on the other. Thus it is important to
look beyond explanations for the crisis that focus on distortions arising from bringing lowincome borrowers into the market. See Korngold, supra note 11, at 728-29 (arguing against
attempts to locate the cause of the current crisis in the Community Reinvestment Act). The
problem was not only that low-income borrowers defaulted after interest rate resets, but a
larger systemic failure of credit risk that was not isolated to the lower end of the market.
197. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1 (7th ed. 2007).

As Gregory Alexander has noted, the foundational modem economic account of property
rights offered by Harold Demsetz "holds that property rights maximize aggregate social
wealth by encouraging people to take into account the costs and benefits of how they use
their property." ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 379-80 (discussing Harold Demsetz, Toward
a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967)).
198. See, e.g., John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The ProprietaryFoundations of
CorporateLaw, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 429, 437-38 (2007) (discussing conceptions of

property rights in which "'Ownership' is defined as the entitlement to exercise 'residual
rights of control').
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particularly the scale and breadth of federal, state, and local interventions to
respond to cascading market failures related to property-put real pressure
on the idea that property is a neutral vessel to align risk and reward.
At a local level, one of the ironies of the current economic crisis is that
the push to promote the ur-privatized vision of ownership and a culture that
increasingly venerated reward for risk taking were in no small measure
responsible for a global collapse. There are at least some documented
benefits for ownership as a tenure model that can undergird our cultural
preference for homeownership.199 But there are countervailing costs, not
the least of which include the real economic and psychological
consequences of the loss of homeownership-costs that are becoming
200
acutely understood in light of the current level of foreclosures.
Moving from the veneration of homeownership to the other heart of the
crisis, the financial sector, reveals an eerie parallel. A long arc of
regulatory change in the past quarter century reduced monitoring and
supervision of financial markets, justified ceaselessly by the argument that
risk taking should be encouraged and rewarded. The consequence of this
excessive risk taking in an era of privatized regulatory structures is that the
nature of the underlying asset base is becoming increasingly seen as a
bewildering failure-something of a global Ponzi scheme (or, perhaps now,
a global Madoff scheme). Direct intervention thus becomes critical to shore
up confidence in a number of arenas, often explicitly to avoid a
psychological herd effect of cascading doubt.
One of the many reminders from this crisis of risk's unpredictability is
the echo in the crisis-torm financial sector of Frank Michelman's
anticommons as made real by Michael Heller's empty Moscow
storefronts. 20 1 Securitization in the subprime sector entailed an acute level
of decomposition of ownership in the classic sense, in which multiple
owners were granted rights of exclusion, producing an atmosphere of
instability, insecurity, and inability to exercise predictable and productive
rights of use. 202 As was the case with Heller's anticommons, in this case of
too much property, the interdependence of property rights resulted in an
opaque decisionmaking structure and a failure to rescue property ownership
20 3
from a downward spiral of insecurity.
199. See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The
Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
949, 970-73 (2008).
200. See generally Loma Fox O'Mahony, Homeownership, Debt, and Default: The
Affective Value of Home and the Challenge of Affordability, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 169 (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy eds., 2009).
201. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-23 (1998); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics,
Economics and the Law of Property,24 NOMOS 3 (1982).
202. Heller, supra note 201, at 664-67.
203. See id. at 673. David A. Dana discusses some of the implications, including the
impossibility of loan modifications, in his article, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Antifragmentation Principle in State Property Law, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),

availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=-1415006.
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As a result, in complex global financial markets no less than in singlefamily housing, conceptions of the balance between risk and reward
instantiated in property are being recalibrated to account for the reality of an
active (if still unproven) safety net. Property's function as a font of security
now more clearly highlights the centrality of the state in bolstering that very
security. This is nothing new in our culture, 20 4 but it is a stark aspect of the
current crisis nonetheless.
4. Coercion Versus Cooperation
Finally, the current crisis also has brought tensions to the surface of
American property law about what, exactly, the prescriptive role of the state
should be when it does intervene. A striking example emerges from the
government's partial nationalization of banks. While European social
democracies have long been accustomed to the notion that government can
legitimately serve to coordinate property rights and market relationships
among private firms, such a notion is both foreign to most in this country
and repugnant to many. 20 5 In our putatively classic liberal market
economy, the state's role is theoretically to protect the integrity of market
interactions. 20 6 State intervention beyond this point raises deep questions
of legitimacy, dilution of competition, and the natural hierarchies that are
of the free
popularly thought to flow from the rough-and-tumble world
20 7
market, even if such interventions occur with regularity.
Fundamental in this conceptualization is the notion that private firms and
individuals have the freedom to engage in a broad range of competitive
behavior, with property rights serving as a source of freedom. This
orientation of private firms vis-A-vis each other, the market, and the state
creates an atmosphere in which state intervention in private structures of
ownership is not only unwelcome, but a signal of abnormal, troubled times.
Against that conceptual baseline, the acquisition of property rights by the
state seems coercive rather than collaborative, aggressive rather than
supportive. Nonetheless, partial or complete nationalization sends a
message that the state has been required to settle affairs and relationships
that private firms can no longer manage. 20 8 Indeed, the primary purpose of
state ownership rights may be the signaling effect. After all, the
government at first proceeded by taking preferred stock in these private
entities, that is, stock with no voting rights and arguably more analogous to
debt than to equity. 20 9 And even these moves towards public ownership
204. See supra Part I.C.
205. Compare VARIETIES

OF CAPITALISM:

THE

INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

OF

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 6-66 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001) with the recent
quotations from Henry Paulson and other top officials, see, e.g., text accompanying note 77.
206. See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 205, at 49, 251.
207. See id. at 8, 251.
208. We thank Lorna Fox O'Mahony for supplying the (for her, from the British context)
familiar adage "capitalized profit, socialized loss" to the American crisis.
209. Such a move may also have been influenced by federal regulations governing the
adequacy of capital maintained by national banks. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A (2009). The
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were tentative. 2 10 Still, as the crisis deepened, federal officials began
considering converting government stock in Citigroup and other banks to
common stock, suggesting a more particularized interest-especially 2when
11
considered in conjunction with the new "stress test"--in coordination.
Moreover, against this backdrop of unwelcome coercion, the particular
regulations accompanying partial nationalization have generated a novel
image of property-that of property as an instrument of punishment. It is
no accident that the first major limitation the government imposed after
taking preferred stock in certain lenders was to cap executive compensation
paid out by those lenders. 2 12 Although there may be excellent reasons to
limit executive compensation and require other concessions in exchange for
state investment, in the context of crisis, they take on an undertone of
sanction rather than regulation. Thus, in an economic age dominated by
massive, multinational firms, criminal law's vocabulary of fines and
probation appear far less potent than property law's vocabulary of
punishment by means of transferring ownership. And so, in response to the
public outcry against corporate misbehavior, the government chose
ownership as a means of retribution.
B. Property as an Influence on Regulatory Design in Times of Crisis
If this crisis is deeply revealing about property norms in our
contemporary culture, norms of property have equally been an active force
in regulatory design during this particular time of crisis. Given the
origination of the crisis in the housing market, it makes sense that the
government's response to the mortgage meltdown would be property
focused. However, as this section argues, the governmental response to the

government's cap on executive compensation belies the merely rhetorical nature of the
government's ownership interest, however, as does the recent move to convert some
preferred stock to common stock.
210. In the face of widespread public distrust, temporary state ownership allowed the
Treasury, Federal Reserve, and other bank regulators to announce that the "U.S. government
stands firmly behind the banking system during this period of financial strain to ensure it
will be able to perform its key function of providing credit to households and businesses."
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Joint Statement by the Treasury, FDIC, OCC,
OTS and the Federal Reserve (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/tg38.htm. Emphasizing the temporary nature of this coordinating role, the press
release ended with the following statement: "Because our economy functions better when
financial institutions are well managed in the private sector, the strong presumption of the
Capital Assistance Program is that banks should remain in private hands." Id.
211. David Enrich & Monica Langley, U.S. Eyes Large Stake in Citi: Taxpayers Could
Own up to 40% of Bank's Common Stock, Diluting Value of Shares, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,

2009, at Al.
212. Paula Cruickshank, Treasury Issues New Restrictions on Executive Compensation

Paid by Financial Institutions, CCH FIN. CRISIS NEWS CENTER, Feb. 4, 2009,
http://www.financialcrisisupdate.com/2009/02/treasury-issues-new-restrictions-onexecutive-compensation-paid-by-financial-institutions.html. The Obama Administration's
stress test for banks has similar connotations of punitive effect. See supra notes 149-50 and
accompanying text.
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broader financial crisis is more surprising in its almost single-minded
engagement with property.
This section tracks the construction of property norms into a set of
regulatory responses, and, in doing so, it overlays the normative tensions
outlined in the previous section onto the regulatory framework that has
developed thus far. The central insight gained from this exercise is that
decidedly different property norms have guided regulatory design at
different levels. On the one hand, regulatory responses to the subprime
mortgage meltdown, where we might expect to see the most far-reaching
and permanent reforms, reactively preserved a core vision of property as
creating ownership opportunities at all levels of market participation in
anticipation of incentivizing industry-driven market correction. Regulation
at the core thus adopted wholesale the "steady-state" property norms that
prevail during times of relatively stable equilibrium, embodying the
relatively more isolationist, opportunity-oriented, risk-rewarding view of
ownership. In particular, the regulatory adoption of these norms dictated
choosing the least radical solutions that protected existing property
institutions.
On the other hand, in the response to failures in wider financial markets,
property has arguably liberated regulatory intervention. At this level,
regulators adopted the property norms that come to the fore in times of
crisis, including a more interconnected, distribution-protective, stabilityoriented, and coordinated view of property. The regulatory choice of new
norms at this level of crisis response resulted in a new role for government
as a coercive owner of property that had previously been perceived as
inaccessibly private.
Considered as a whole, the property story that emerges from the response
to this crisis is a distinctive narrative of simultaneous constraint and
liberation. It is a particular version of the age-old debate between public
and private, in which large-scale rhetoric and massive public intervention
combine to restore and protect private rights of ownership. It is a unique
lesson about federalism, emphasizing the federal government's role in
coordinating a response to a global economic crisis as imposing as any
military threat. And thus far it is a discourse on the resolute adherence to
the market's integrity, undergirded by certain measures of last resort, in
staving off future global crises.
1. Property's Influence in the Response to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
Given the enormity, immediacy, and centrality of the subprime
meltdown, it would be reasonable to expect a regulatory response targeting
the meltdown quite specifically. From the popular discourse surrounding
the passage of HERA, to the early and excitable media attention to the
subprime meltdown, to Treasury Secretary Paulson's initial instinct to use
bailout funds to buy toxic debt, the nation diagnosed the cause of this
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financial crisis as originating in the residential real estate markets. 21 3 Yet
early regulation at the core of the crisis was decidedly understated. Perhaps
the global economy could not have been calmed by a response within the
real estate markets alone. 2 14 But in this section, we argue that propertyfocused ideology also shaped the pursuit and cultivation of solutions.
Consider HERA, the federal government's initial regulatory response to
the mortgage meltdown. At the rhetorical level, the title of this statute
speaks volumes in its focus on housing as the stabilizer of markets and the
originator of economic recovery. 2 15 Unquestionably, HERA was much
more interventionist than its statutory predecessors, which had been passed
when market failure was occurring in more limited segments of the real
estate markets. Most conspicuously, both the legislative and executive
branches began to question the primacy of contract principles, which had
served as the mainstay for the regulatory focus on guidance about predatory
behavior, disclosures to consumers, and even incentive-based tax supports.
But neither HERA nor the other early responses to the meltdown sought
to renegotiate steady-state property norms supporting the protection of
ownership. Thanks in part to the voluntary nature of the refinancing
program, which is the remedy most directly targeting homeowners, the
statute's primary impact appears to have been rhetorical. Very few
refinancings under the statute have actually occurred. 2 16 Moreover, of the
range of possible choices, HERA's two regulatory targets, lenders and the
government-sponsored entities, historically have been the most regulated
and, not coincidentally, the least associated with traditional rights of
ownership. In all but a few jurisdictions, lenders' interests as mortgagees
2 17
are technically "security" interests, rather than "ownership" interests.
213. It was not until February 2009 that regulators reverted to the plan to buy up toxic
debt and also established a more comprehensive foreclosure prevention program. See
Bebchuk, supra note 132, at 344.
214. The consistent prescriptive focus on the real estate markets by Professors
Nesvetailova and Wray, both applying Hyman Minsky's scholarship, intriguingly counters
this view. Nesvetailova, supra note 80, at 21-23; Wray, supra note 88, at 61-65.
215. The same is true of the rhetoric surrounding the bill's passage, which portrayed the
protection of homeownership as the linchpin to overcoming the crisis. For example, the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) website included the following:
"Q: Will this law be a bailout for speculators, homeowners, investors, and lenders?
A: No. It is narrowly tailored to keep families in their homes."
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008 FAQ (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.hud.gov/news/recoveryactfaq.cfn. And according to
the House Committee on Financial Services,
H.R. 3221, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, represents the most
comprehensive response yet to the American mortgage crisis, and will help
families facing foreclosure keep their homes, help other families avoid
foreclosures in the future, and help the recovery of communities harmed by empty
homes caught in the foreclosure process.
House Committee on Financial Services, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008,
http://financialservices.house.gov/FHA.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
216. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
217. In title theory jurisdictions, the lender technically retains fee title to the collateral,
giving the lender the right of possession, but most title states nonetheless treat the lender's
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Until quite recently, when lenders' security interests were up against
2 18
mortgagors' ownership of their homes, the law protected the latter.
HERA's refinancing program is thus not a new frontier so much as a return
2 19
to principles established over centuries of mortgagor protection.
Particularly in light of this and other limitations on the FHA refinancing
programs, the property story that emerges from HERA's provisions is
combined
extravagant steady-state rhetoric about ownership as a cure-all, 220
with a restrained regulatory balancing of ownership opportunities.
President Obama's HASP seems to attempt to convert HERA's rhetoric
to tangible protections for homeowners, most conspicuously by mandating
some of the protections that HERA merely incentivized. Viewed as a
property story, however, the program is consistent with HERA in protecting
ownership, if a bit more emphatically. The image of homeownership as an
important means of individual wealth accumulation, as well as economic
stimulus, pervades this program. As in HERA, homeownership protections
are balanced against attempts to rejuvenate the government-sponsored
entities and, thus, the secondary market. Also consistent here is the reliance
on credit-refinancing and loan modification-as a stabilizing force.
Ubiquitous in this effort, as in HERA, is the explicitly temporary and
reactive approach to market correction. The primary if not exclusive goal
of both programs is to restore the housing market to a state of normality.
Taken as a whole, the regulatory focus on property as ownership may
certainly be defensible; but it is hard to imagine that it could have been
accidental.
By no means were these the only available regulatory choices, nor was
this the only possible property story. For quite some time, consumer
advocates and others had been pressing for a range of other regulatory
options, some of which had been widely adopted by states prior to the
deregulation of the banking industry. For example, usury caps had been the
norm 22 1 prior to their preemption by the Depository Institutions

interest simply as a security interest. See Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 Mo. L.
REv. 249, 267-70 (1999).
218. Rashmi Dyal-Chand, From Status to Contract: Evolving Paradigmsfor Regulating
Consumer Credit,73 TENN. L. REV 303, 307-16 (2006).

219. And even at that, the refinancing program is voluntary and incentive based. The
other prominent regulatory move in HERA was the special oversight of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, two entities that were created by the government and have always been
regulated heavily. Even the temporary moratorium on foreclosures by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac was only on debt securitized by Fannie Mae, leaving private owners of
mortgage-backed securities in the secondary market still essentially unregulated.
220. The refinancing program, licensing requirements, and monitoring of capitalization
levels evince a cautious regulatory interest in protecting homeownership. Also evident,
particularly in the reforms aimed at the government-sponsored entities, is a clear interest in
protecting the ownership interests in the secondary market for mortgage-backed securities.
The limitations in the provisions aimed at protecting homeowners reveal the balancing of
lenders' and investors' property interests.
221. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine
and Its Effect on PredatoryLending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 526 (2004).
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Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.222 Both in response to
predatory lending and to the subprime meltdown, a number of advocates
urged the adoption of suitability requirements similar to those imposed on
the sale of securities. 223 And the widespread fraud in the brokerage
industries has led some recently 224
to propose fiduciary duty requirements on
real estate and mortgage brokers.
But, aside from being more prospective in orientation, each of these
reforms would limit access to credit and, ultimately, to homeownership.
For example, homeowners currently have almost unlimited opportunities to
obtain credit using their home equity as collateral. Suitability requirements
would change this expectation by requiring much more careful review of
borrowers' ability to repay loans, particularly those with exotic terms,
thereby exempting some borrowers from the market both for purchase
money and home equity loans. 225 The imposition of fiduciary duties on
brokers, if it had the intended effect, would lead brokers to provide
information about risk that might convince borrowers not to borrow.
Studies on usury caps long ago documented the tightened availability of
credit. 226
One consequence would be that fewer low-income and
marginalized borrowers could buy homes. Another consequence would be
that equity in homes already owned would more likely be protected in its
illiquid form.
Similarly, limitations on the holder-in-due-course doctrine would
contract the secondary market. Investors would be unwilling to buy
securities backed by mortgages with higher risks of default. Lenders would
be less likely to make loans with exotic terms if they could not sell such
loans on the secondary market. Fewer buyers would enter the secondary
market. Ultimately, less capital would flow to the primary market for
mortgages. 227
222. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501, 94 Stat. 132, 161 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1735f-7(a) (2006)).
223. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 1317-66; Alvin C. Harrell,
Commentary: The Subprime Lending Crisis-ThePerfect Credit Storm?, 61 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 626, 631 (2007).
224. See, e.g., KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, STEERED WRONG:
BROKERS,
BORROWERS,
AND SUBPRIME LOANS
35-36
(2008),
available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/steered-wrongbrokers-borrowers-and-subprime-loans.pdf.
225. See Harrell, supra note 223, at 630-31.
226. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for
Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home
Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REv. 1083, 1107-09 (1984); see also Cathy Lesser
Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved with Good CongressionalIntentions:
Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REv. 473, 476, 57375 (2000) (advocating against usury deregulation).
227. For a summary of traditional arguments supporting the holder-in-due-course
doctrine, see generally Gregory E. Maggs, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine as a Default
Rule, 32 GA. L. REV. 783 (1998). For an argument that it results in only a minor reduction in
credit availability, see William H. Lawrence & John H. Minan, The Effect of Abrogating the
Holder-in-Due-Course Doctrine on the Commercialization of Innovative Consumer
Products, 64 B.U. L. REV. 325, 338-40 (1984).
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Like HERA and HASP, most of these alternative frames for regulating
both the primary and secondary mortgage markets center on the protection
of a fairly conventional vision of ownership rights. But unlike recent
regulatory programs, including the February 2009 stimulus bill, which
uphold the tradition of expanding the circle of ownership to new
homeowners, these alternative property norms would limit access to
ownership in order to safeguard ownership by those who have already
attained it. In other words, these regulations would focus on preserving the
equity in owned homes rather than on increasing liquidity. Some of these
moves would also fail to recognize the new owners in the increasingly
global circle of ownership, the secondary-market investors.
In short, the government's response thus far to the crisis at the level of
primary mortgage markets has been constructed emphatically on the steadystate vision of property. Property manifests as a negative right of access to
credit and ownership opportunities. It serves as a powerful tool of wealth
accumulation. Even under more recent interventions, refinancing of debt
(for the purpose of restoring opportunity) takes primacy over foreclosure
relief. The latter would be a more obvious means of establishing a
distributional baseline. Importantly in this property story, strident rhetoric
about the dignity, primacy, and social worth of ownership underpin
regulatory reaction and incrementalism. The Blackstonian traces in this
view of property are not limited to notions of privacy, dominion, and access
to markets. Implicit in this property story is a discomfort with sudden
change and indeed with regulation. In response to failures in disclosure and
incentive-based regimes, this conception of property proposes more
enticing incentives-refinancing rather than reductions in debt through
"cram-downs."
The assumption is thus that incentives will inspire
responsible behavior.
At this level of regulatory intervention, property also symbolizes risk
taking rather than mere subsistence or even security. Property is a tool of
individual choice. At bottom, property signifies access to the free market,
and indeed to freedom itself. In this property story, the isolationist vision of
property materializes as an obsession with privacy. Thanks to industry
innovations, FICO scores now substitute for face-to-face meetings with
loan officers. 228

Little or no documentation is required to obtain a loan.

Contracts, in lieu of intrusive regulation, govern rights in private
relationships.
Finally, this incrementalist vision carries with it the sense that the current
crisis is an anomaly rather than a foreseeable event that could happen again.
The regulatory response has not been reactive only because of the
unpredictability of the crisis. It has also been reactive because regulators
have assumed that at the local level, the market does not need a more

228. See Wray, supra note 88, at 48.
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or coordination. This is an inherently
permanent form of correction
2 29
noninterventionist vision.
Thus, at the epicenter of the crisis, in the response to the subprime
meltdown, the steady-state vision of property constrained regulators from
deconstructing rights of access and ownership that had accumulated at all
levels of market participation. The immediacy and enormity of the crisis
required a relatively far-reaching regulatory response.
Against the
background of a restrained core vision of property, regulators defined "farreaching" as the opportunity to recalculate and assign risk. Aside from the
need for far-reaching impact, political expedience also required a firm
regulatory response to the pervasive inattention, speculative behavior, and
outright fraud manifest in the mortgage market, with its onerous effects on
certain categories of consumers. But here again, the regulatory focus was
on fraud rather than on more diffuse speculation, on licensing rather than on
regulating excessive profit. The former type of regulation was reactive; the
latter would require more prospective intervention. This was a vision of
property law wearing its nuisance hat: an attempt to remedy a noxious
result of a previously (and presumptively imminent) socially beneficial use.
2. Property's Influence in the Response to Financial-Market Failures
In contrast to the restrained property story emanating from the
government's response to failures in the primary mortgage market,
property's influence in the response to broader financial market failures is a
story with much more regulatory heft. At the forefront, in dollars,
commentary, and press, was the Treasury Department's decision to take
equity stakes in private firms. Regulation in the face of the understandably
pervasive sense of distrust in private decision making by financial firms
took the form of a counterbalancing governmental ownership interest. It is
as though some conceptual barrier remained that made equity different in a
foundational way from the combination of regulation, insurance, and
indirect subsidies that had preceded it. In its use of TARP funds, the
federal government pointedly thrust aside traditional protections buttressing
private ownership-at least on a temporary basis. It deliberately chose to
disrupt the august vision in liberal economies of corporations as bastions of
private ownership, contracts, relationships, and risk taking. 230 Perhaps it
229. As discussed below, the state's response to financial market failures has carried with
it more open consideration of significant change in the regulation of financial and other
markets. See infra Part III.C.
230. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the CorporationIs a Nexus of
Contracts,and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CoRp. L. 819 (1999); Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:

Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and

Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see also United States v. Jon-T Chems.,
Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Under the doctrine of limited liability, the owner of
a corporation is not liable for the corporation's debts. Creditors of the corporation have
recourse only against the corporation itself, not against its parent company or shareholders.
It is on this assumption that 'large undertakings are rested, vast enterprises are launched, and

huge sums of capital attracted."' (quoting Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944))
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did so because, at that point in the unraveling global economy, no new
entrants were available to join the circle of ownership. The only imperative
was to increase liquidity by any means possible. Even so, as extensive
experience with financial crises in other parts
of the world shows, means
23 1
other than equity ownership were available.
Even the limited equity ownership taken by the federal government is, in
contemporary American terms, a relatively radical move. To those who had
come of age in the past quarter century, it can be breathtaking to hear or
read commentary on the need to "nationalize," "own," or "take control" of
private banks. 232 After decades in which the institution of property had
served as a principal means of drawing clear definitional lines between
liberal and social democracies, liberal and coordinated market economies,
neoliberalism and welfarism, 233 suddenly it seemed that this very same
institution was functioning to blur those lines.
If only at the level of rhetoric, this move crossed important property
boundaries, not least of all between public and private. It was a move that
was grounded explicitly in a set of property norms that punctuated the
equilibrium of the preceding decades. It may be inaccurate to say, as some
commentators have, that "we're all Keynesians now." 234
But the
admittedly lurching response of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the
Federal Housing Finance Agency seem to be generating increasing comfort
with both direct state investment in private entities and with exercising
broad powers to nationalize specific companies or entities seen as critical to
the underlying structure of financial markets and the economy. It is striking
that as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and potentially significant portions of the
banking industry come into forms of public ownership, there have been no
(citing Baker v. Raymond Int'l, 656 F.2d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
983 (1982))).
231. For one discussion of various options, see Anna Gelpern, Systemic Corporate and
Bank Restructuringin FinancialCrisis, 34 INT'L LAW. 223 (2000).
232. Edmund L. Andrews & Mark Landler, White House Overhauling Rescue Planfor
Economy: As World Leaders Meet, New Emphasis on Direct Capital Infusionsfor Banks,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at Al ("As recently as late September, the idea of letting the
government buy part of the banking system had been unthinkable in the Bush administration.
To many officials, such intervention seemed like a European-style government intrusion in
the markets."); Matthew Richardson & Nouriel Roubini, How Swede It Is: To Shore Up the
Banks, Nationalize Them, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2009, at B3 ("The U.S. banking system is
close to being insolvent, and unless we want to become like Japan in the 1990s-or the
United States in the 1930s-the only way to save it is to nationalize it."); Gerald F. Seib,
Split over Big Government Persists, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2009, at A2 ("The Treasury
Department is confronting a once-unthinkable decision over whether to nationalize big
American banks. It's clear the Obama administration doesn't want to take that step, even
though the British government is heading in precisely that direction, and some analysts think
some form of nationalization here is inevitable.").

233. See, e.g.,

COMPARING WELFARE CAPITALISM:

SOCIAL POLICY AND POLITICAL

USA (Bernhard Ebbinghaus & Philip Manow eds.,
2001); Isabela Mares, Firms and the Welfare State: When, Why, and How Does Social
Policy Matter to Employers?, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 205, at 184.
ECONOMY IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE

234. This was actually a quotation from Richard Nixon, made in 1971. See Editorial,
We're All Keynesians Now, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2008, at A12.
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modem Steel Seizure cases, 2 35 or even much popular outcry. In the
immediate aftermath, companies deemed "too large to fail" seemed to be
lining up for similar intervention, beginning with General Motors and
Chrysler. The pendulum has already begun to swing back again, with
companies starting to reduce their dependence on federal aid, but at an
institutional level, this wave of state control is at least putting some pressure
on conceptions of property rights feeding opportunity, risk, and reward that
vilify the role of the state in creating the conditions under which individual
2 36
entrepreneurship can take place.
The gravity of the crisis notwithstanding, the choice to regulate by taking
equity stakes was again just one choice among a number. Nationalization
could be more substantively interventionist, as it has been in some
European countries. 237 Such a move would certainly cross even more
property boundaries. By contrast, much of what partial nationalization
accomplished could have been done in the form of "mere" regulation--of
corporate behavior, for example. In a similar vein, funds could have been
transferred in the form of outright loans rather than equity investments.
These options would have resonated in property to a far lesser extent.
It is unclear whether the regulatory reliance on property felt like a choice
to those involved, or something like the least radical among only radical
options. Undeniably, regulation that overtly used the vocabulary of either
socialization or welfare would have received a more negative public
response than that of ownership. In the face of public outrage, it may have
been imperative to displace the autonomy of private firms with a level of
coercion. It was an acknowledgement that aid to these firms was
inappropriate without some corresponding amount of control. It was also a
signpost of the collective willingness to suspend our traditional norms as
the crisis deepened and broadened.
Underpinning the response to the broader economic crisis, then, is an
emergent property story grounded in "crisis" norms rather than in the
steady-state norms that have so prominently constrained regulation of the
subprime meltdown. In this property story, the idea of property as
relational is dominant. Regulation of the financial markets in this crisis
may for generations be the paradigmatic example of the Legal Realists'
claim that property exists to serve relationships. 238 The globalized ripple
effects from the subprime meltdown forced a set of regulatory responses

235. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(limiting the power of the President to seize private property during times of emergency).
236. On the other hand, there was something oddly consistent about the post-Kelo public
outcry and the public's response to nationalization in the shadow of global crisis. Both
responses were grounded in a particular vision of the power, perhaps even sacredness, of
property, however contested in crisis.
237. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
238. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM

SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:

THE PARADOXES OF

PROPERTY (2000); Cohen, supra note 68; Robert L. Hale, Bargaining,Duress, and Economic
Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1943).
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that strongly refuted Blackstonian absolutism: property rights had to be
limited to protect the property rights of others.
Although property retained its rhetorical connection with power, here the
power was public, collective, and even coercive in its effect. It was public
both because the government's involvement included the increasingly
meaningful right to control and because of the transparency of the
Treasury's actions. Press releases accompanied purchases of preferred
stock. 239 Rather than serving as a tool of individual opportunity, property
ownership in this response became a means of collective action against the
240
broad distributional consequences of unrestrained private behavior.
In these aspects of the regulatory response, the image of property as a set
of duties, not just rights, has come to the fore. In this sense, nationalization
recognizes that the assets at stake included pensions, homes, and savings
accounts. This was a moment of stabilizing, indeed even subsistence, rather
than risk taking. And at this level, even if only briefly, property served as
the basis for some kind of a positive right. In an extraordinary inversion of
prevailing property norms, property ownership served briefly as a locus for
efforts to achieve stability, more in the nature of a safety net than a risk
enabler, within the free market.
Finally, implicit in this emergent property story is a reliance (however
uncomfortable) on regulation.
In contrast to responses targeted at
preserving homeownership, this was not an incentive program to promote
more accurate assessment of risk. It was a moment of punctuated
equilibrium-a large-scale "cram-down" of sorts to mandate responsible
behavior. It was the seizure of temporary governmental control for the
purpose of managing risk. Governmental involvement conceded both the
need for coordinated action at times of economic crisis and the
reverberating public consequences of private, corporate decision making. It
is in this respect that property's drift toward the coordination among firms
in more socialized economies is most apparent. 24 1 Moreover, in this vision
of property as public, property was used as a tool of coercing appropriate
behavior. The nation relied on property's potential to punish and deter
deviant behavior by banks, financial firms, the auto industry, and others. It
was, in sum, a more radical vision of property.
Perhaps unpredictably, in the outer reaches of the crisis, the imperative to
act appears to have driven interpretations of property that challenge an
apparent recent hardening of the individualized, classical liberal vision. At
239. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP
Investment in GMAC (Dec. 29, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1335.htm;
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., FDIC & U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the FDIC on Citigroup (Nov.
23, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressibcreg/20081123a.htm.
240. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, Chilly Review from Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2008, at Al ("'It absolutely has to be punitive,' Mr. Baker said. 'If they sell us the junk,
then we own the company."' (quoting Dean Baker, Co-director, Center for Economic and
Policy Research)).
241. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
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this stage in the crisis, at the level of globalized losses, regulators employed
a very different core vision of property by defining "far-reaching"
regulation as a top-down intervention in the industry most connected to the
problem of escalating illiquidity. It was as if the prospect of a global
economic shutdown was equivalent to a military threat or a constitutional
crisis. 242 Nor could the responsibility for acting be shared with the states.
National coordination was required, as was unified and decisive action.
The federal government's authority in the face of such a crisis was
incontestable.
3. Normative Tensions in Property's Influence
The fact that different property norms guided regulation at different
levels of crisis response creates stark inconsistencies. Property theorists
have long recognized the extensive historical provenance of these tensions,
divides that are arguably foundational to the very institution of property. It
is a truism that property is not absolute, although this crisis has made that
fact more widely accessible. But the coexistence of property as freedom,
and property as (not just duty, but also) coercion and even punishment, is
more contemporary and discomfiting. Moreover, it seems less obvious,
after this crisis, what the tipping point is between property as enabler of risk
and property as stabilizing force. And it is reasonable to wonder how glibly
a bright line between liberalism and welfarism could be redrawn after
witnessing the roles property has recently played.
But in addition to the unswervingly strong ownership rhetoric, there has
been another crucial consistency in property's role in all aspects of the
state's response:
underlying the regulatory interventions was the
expectation that such interventions were merely reactive and temporary. In
seeking to remedy homeownership failures, the chief provisions in both
HERA and HASP were explicitly short-term. 243 In attempting to stabilize
the financial markets, federal officials have repeatedly described TARP,
government-backed guarantees, and, of course, nationalization as
"temporary." 2 " Even President Obama's stabilization initiatives and his
242. In this respect, the experiences of governments in other parts of the world facing
civil unrest as a result of economic crisis may have seemed too fresh and looming to permit a
restrained response.
243. See supra notes 124-27, 152-54 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY WHITE PAPER:

THE CAPITAL

ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND ITS ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL STABILITY PLAN 3, available at

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/tg40_capwhitepaper.pdf
("U.S.
government
ownership is not an objective of CAP. However, to the extent that significant government
stake in a financial institution is an outcome of the program, our goal will be to keep the
period of government ownership as temporary as possible and encourage the return of
private capital to replace government investment."); Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Treasury
Sec'y, Remarks on the Role of the GSEs in Supporting the Housing Recovery Before the
Economic Club of Washington (Jan.
7, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/hp1345.htm ("This conservatorship, with the explicit backing of the federal
government, is temporary and must be resolved for the long-term."); Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Joint Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F. Geithner,
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commitment to new "rules of the road" 24 5 do not evidence the more
permanent reallocation of responsibilities and control evident in many
European countries. Indeed, the particular focus of the response on
financial institutions, liquidity, and stabilization of markets serves precisely
the steady-state property story of ownership and access. 246 For example,
current congressional interest in a systemic risk regulator of last resort
reveals a clear reluctance to regulate except reactively, when all else
fails. 247 This is not to advocate any particular policy response, but rather to
note that even in the depth of crisis, a rhetoric of market functioning, even
with renewed oversight, has been invoked to preserve a sphere of traditional
ownership and reward for risk.
C. What the Fire This Time Reveals
At this juncture, it is appropriate to widen our perspective to understand
what this crisis reveals-and similar moments of punctuated equilibrium
historically have revealed-for the development of property law more
broadly. Given that federal, state, and local responses to the crisis continue
to unfold, it is too early to get a clear sense of where the current crisis will
leave ground-level property law. But some aspects of the crisis and
response may well have lasting effect. Certainly, in the short run, it appears
clear that access to credit will be more tightly constrained in a consumerprotection mode, 248 and market regulation in a number of contexts will be
approached with less reflexive hostility. 249 It is also possible that the recent
seeming ascendancy of the property rights movement may lose some
momentum. The movement's unceasing hostility to communal necessity
loses rhetorical force in light of the felt necessity for an active state role.
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Sheila Bair, Comptroller of the
Currency John C. Dugan, and Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision John M. ReichFinancial Stability Plan (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg21.htm.
245. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Outlines Framework for
Regulatory Reform: Provides New Rules of the Road, Focuses First on Containing Systemic
Risk (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg72.htm.
246. Curiously enough, these extraordinary measures, which have been invoked to rescue
companies that are "too big to fail," have also functioned to avoid some of the basic
consequences-such as bankruptcies-that it is reasonable to expect of property ownership.
247. Sarah Borchersen-Keto, Frank Says Systemic Risk Regulator Biggest Near-Term
Priority,
CCH
FIN.
CRISIS
NEWS
CENTER,
Feb.
3,
2009,
http://www.financialcrisisupdate.com/2009/02/frank-says-systemic-risk-regulator-biggestnear-term-priority.html.
248. See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court
Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual
Banking System and Consumer Protection, in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., eds.,

forthcoming 2010) (describing a recent U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court limited
the preemptive reach of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, thereby freeing the
state attorney general to seek judicial enforcement of state fair lending laws against national
banks); Robert C. Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance (Mar. 23, 2009) (unpublished article),
availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-1367278.
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Any serious attempt at alleviating this crisis will require the industry and
its regulators to reexamine some of their most basic assumptions about
property as they seek to rebuild the markets engendered by it. In addition to
highlighting the centrality of land valuation, the crisis has made clear that
individual loan terms matter a great deal, as do the roles of intermediaries
and even real estate brokers in predicting and valuing risk. It also appears
that foreclosure laws and processes are no longer in sync with the complex
balance of ownership generated by securitization. At some level, adaptation
must occur. We are, accordingly, likely to see changes in a number of areas
of mortgage law, including pressure to allow the modification of mortgage
debts in bankruptcy, 250 possible changes to the holder-in-due-course
doctrine for negotiable instruments, 2 5 1 reevaluation of the tools of
standardization, 252 reforms to foreclosure proceedings, 253 and other
changes.
These doctrinal developments are important, to be sure. This crisis,
however, is likely to be more significant for what it will highlight in terms
of contested conceptions of property. As we have argued, our current
property moment underscores the unity of property on several dimensions,
giving cultural heft to interconnected, ecological visions of property.
Property, moreover, retains surprisingly significant cultural force even in
the face of potential social and economic dislocation that calls into question
any valorized image of individual ownership. And property in crisis has a
tendency to remind people that, although rife with its own imperfections,
the state is indispensible when the social costs of existing property
arrangements spread.
Indeed, the insecurity of property that the current crisis has brought to the
foreground has generated reflexive fears as retirement savings evaporate (in
an era in which privatization has become the predominant model of
254
retirement security) and trillions of dollars of wealth appear to evaporate.
This raises an important point about the broader popular resonance of the
current crisis: perhaps temporarily, as with so many cultural valences
around property, our culture may come to recognize that state action that
seems to cut deeply into traditional notions of property can be as stabilizing
250. See Levitin, supra note 11.
251. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
252. See Dana, supra note 203 (proposing new procedures for modifying mortgage
loans); Anna Gelpem & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075 (2009)
(discussing strategies for overcoming rigidity in pooling and servicing agreements);
Komgold, supra note 11, at 741-46 (discussing the Mortgage Electronic Registration
System (MERS), which tracks and processes the ownership and transfer of mortgages, a
system that is coming into question in the current crisis).
253. Consider Melissa Jacoby's recommendations on mortgage delinquency management.
Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of
Delinquency Management, 76 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2261, 2278-95 (2008).
254. Not literally, of course, as market valuation is merely a representation of how a
willing seller and willing buyer might price an asset at any given time, and a drop in the
stock market does not represent a literal loss in any resource value.
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as state inaction (or at least less visible action). One of the more influential
concerns articulated about the state's role in property rights is Michelman's
idea that certain types of state action give rise to what he described as
"demoralization costs." 255 These costs derive from the uncertainty and
disaffection that people feel when faced with interference with their
expectations about their entitlements. 256 His idea has been invoked2 to
57
justify minimalism in how the state approaches the terms of ownership
and has added a powerful undergirding for the long-standing argument that
258
stability of expectation is a paramount virtue for any property system.
Although the idea that people suffer a species of demoralization when the
state alters their property rights continues to resonate, we rarely pause to
consider the power of the state to have the opposite effect-in some sense,
to buck up our collective "morale" when widespread risk taking with
respect to basic assets fails. The current economic crisis, with its
multitrillion dollar interventions into financial, housing, and other markets,
provides an apt moment to do so.
What the crisis may reveal, then, is that stability may be important for
property, less because individual expectation must always be paramount,
but rather because it falls at times to the state to backstop and mitigate what
would be harshest about a system that venerates individual expectationand risk taking and reward-above all else. In many ways, a central thrust
of the current response is aimed as much at the psychology of the market as
it is at the underlying economic fundamentals. In this respect, it sends a
strong signal about the unique power of the state to rectify broadscale
collapse. If the state is often seen as a threat to individual liberty-with
property standing as a bulwark against arbitrary action-then the ability of
the state to respond to crisis can act as a perennial reminder of the opposite
proposition.
Normatively, this may lead to a greater willingness to embrace an ethic
of mutual responsibility around property.2 5 9 If property retains its greatest
cultural force as a bulwark against the state in the classical liberal vision or
a residuum of exclusion in the modem economic/utilitarian version of that
conception, then regulation is suspect as a default. Thus, if the prevailing
conception of property is one of isolation, where externalities are an
aberration to be responded to on a grudging basis, then conceptions of the
common good hold little traction. By contrast, if property is understood as
deeply interconnected, woven into an inextricable web, then there is nothing
more natural than a role for the community in modulating the consequences
255. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundationsof "JustCompensation " Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-16 (1967).
256. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 60-64 (1977).
257. See, e.g., DANA & MERRILL, supra note 27, at 36 (discussing the role of
demoralization costs and settlement costs in the calculus of governmental decision making).
258. See supra note 53 (discussing Jeremy Bentham and his modem descendants

emphasizing the value of stable expectations in ordering property).
259. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-ObligationNorm in American Property Law,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 818-19 (2009).
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of what happens in that web. Whether the community will accept a more
overtly redistributive impulse once the crisis subsides is another question.
It is also likely that this crisis will hasten the national, uniformityoriented tendencies in property law, with the federal government taking
such an active role in responding to the crisis. From a formal perspective,
property will continue nominally to be a creature of state law. As a
practical matter, however, the acceleration of national regulatory regimes
for traditionally state-oriented aspects of property could shift the balance of
power. This harmonizing tendency is driven in times of relative stasis
primarily by market demands, 260 but in crisis, the institutional capacity of
the federal government to act tends to make national-level regulatory
response the default.
Likewise, in this crisis, both in terms of real estate and mortgage markets,
as well as the larger financial system, there is likely to be at least a period of
proactive, systematic efforts to conceptualize the structure of property. This
will counterbalance the largely reactive, piecemeal conflict resolution that
has defined the relative stasis of recent decades. The extent to which such
efforts will reach beyond liquidity provision, correlative protections of last
resort in bankruptcy, and disclosure enhancements to a more fundamental
restructuring of the real estate and credit markets remains to be seen. It is
reasonable to expect that both the national-level regulatory impulse and the
extent of proactive intervention will be driven by the industry itself in its
push towards globalization. Perhaps globalization too will inform the
development of new "rules of the road" reflecting a greater level of
coordination.
Ultimately, however, as has occurred regularly in American history, it
seems just as possible that the valence of property rights will return to
something closer to the possessive individualist vision. 26 1 Advocates can
and often do react hyperbolically to any change in the structure of property
rights that might represent some unalterable turn towards collectivization or
laissez-faire absolutism. But in the broad sweep, there seems to be
something of a regression to the mean in the eternal dialectic of individual
2 62
and state.
Perhaps more than any other signal, the familiar echo of strident rhetoric
surrounding a core veneration of ownership portends a pendulum swing
back toward the individualist vision. In this respect, there is a marked
260. See generally Malloy, supra note 28; Schill, supra note 28.

261. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
262. This pendulum can swing quickly in both directions. In Oregon, for example, the
infamous Measure 37-which mandated compensation for the exercise of ordinary land use
regulatory powers-seemed to enshrine an absolutist vision of the threat to private property
represented by land use regulation. After a few years experiencing what it meant for
people's neighbors to act without restraint or planning in land use, Oregonians reversed
course. The public reaction to the Kelo decision, moreover, taken as a singular moment of
public intrusion on property rights, may end up being another example, although economic
crisis has a way of lowering the outrage felt when individual property owners fail to block
the redevelopment of distressed communities.
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consistency in the evolving regulatory response. Perhaps also one of the
more enduring lessons from the discourse of institutional evolution would
be to understand whether this consistency is part of the cycle between
steady-state change and punctuated equilibrium-a buffering system of
sorts that the institution builds in for crises such as this. These possibilities,
hinging on the centrality of property norms, are justification enough for a
more careful comparison of rhetoric and policy in the Great Depression and
other key property moments.
One implication of focusing on property in times of crisis, ultimately, is
that the dialectic can at a minimum overcome the path dependency that
marks so much of the development of the law. 263 In crisis, there is a
stronger collective sense that existing institutional arrangements are far less
stable than they appear in times of stasis, and this gives freedom to ask
questions that might seem untenable in less fraught times.
The meltdown we are experiencing, like crises past, will not come close
to resolving eternal dilemmas deeply woven into the American narrative of
property, but it does provide a crucible under which the conceptual
foundations and political resonance of private property are being tested.
The massive scale of government intervention in financial markets, ongoing
calls for even more direct intervention on behalf of borrowers, and the
growing recognition that unmediated private ordering around property can
have devastating-indeed global-spillovers puts increasing pressure on
the idea of property as a private refuge. The current crisis reveals in very
strong terms that, while the Blackstonian vision of property as the realm of
individual exclusion still has powerful cultural resonance, it does not long
stand as a barrier to more civic-minded interventions.
CONCLUSION

Our current economic crisis has already sparked allusion to Yeats's
famous cyclical image: "Turning and turning in the widening gyre / The
falcon cannot hear the falconer; / Things fall apart; the centre cannot
hold. ''264 Apocalyptic visions come readily to mind during times of
upheaval, but cycles do turn, and, in the discourse of property, there has
rarely been consensus about what the center is that might or might not hold.
At one level, property can seem an inherently conservative legal
institution, reflexively resistant to change, preserving as it does the realm of
settled expectation. Change does come, generally incrementally, and
perhaps often reluctantly. But times of crisis often accelerate that change
and spark unlikely reactions in return. Property in crisis raises the most
fundamental questions about the nature of what it means to own, invest,
transact, and rely on property. It remains to be seen whether our current
263. Cf Hathaway, supra note 33, at 635-45.
264. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W. B.
YEATS 187 (Richard J. Finneran ed., rev. 2d ed. 1996), quoted in Paul Krugman, The
Widening Gyre, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 2008, at A27.
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economic crisis and the government's response will be remembered as a
simple adjustment after a bubble or a watershed moment. Either way, this
"property moment" has brought core conceptions of property to the
forefront of popular discourse, stirring anxiety but hopefully also thoughtful
reconsideration.

